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ABSTRACT

Exploring Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Plea Bargain Decisions
by
Melanie Close

Advisor: Margaret Kovera

According to an economic model of plea bargaining, defendants’ plea decisions are based on
their estimated trial prospects (i.e. likelihood of conviction and severity of sentence). However,
information communicated during interrogations may provide defendants with misinformation
about trial prospects, thus biasing their subsequent plea decisions. Furthermore, the model fails
to address why innocent individuals plead guilty less often than guilty individuals even when
trial prospects are identical. I investigated whether Reid-style interrogation techniques increase
the likelihood of a guilty plea by inflating suspects’ estimates of the severity of the outcomes
should they go to trial. I also examined whether anxiety moderates or mediates the relationship
between guilt and plea decisions to better understand the psychological mechanisms underlying
plea disparities. Study 1 participants listened to anxiety-inducing or neutral audio tracks, read
case summaries in which guilt and interrogation techniques varied, and made a hypothetical plea
decision. Reid-style interrogation techniques increased guilty pleas by increasing estimates of
trial prospects, but only among guilty participants. Manipulated anxiety did not moderate the
effect of guilt on plea decisions. Study 2 participants engaged in the cheating paradigm (Russano
et al., 2005) in which participant guilt and interrogation techniques were varied. Maximization
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(but not minimization) increased guilty pleas among guilty defendants, but this effect was not
mediated by trial prospects. State anxiety did not mediate the relationship between guilt and
guilty pleas. These findings provide evidence of the detrimental effect of Reid-style interrogation
techniques on suspects’ legal outcomes, even in the absence of a confession.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The right to a fair and speedy trial by an impartial jury is constitutionally guaranteed to
all criminal defendants, yet this right is invoked by very few. Approximately 97 percent of
federal convictions and 94 percent of state convictions are secured through guilty pleas, in which
criminal defendants admit guilt and waive their rights to a jury trial in exchange for a punishment
ostensibly more lenient than that which they would be awarded in court (Alschuler, 1979;
Missouri v. Frye, 2012). Although regarded by many legal scholars as unduly coercive
(Alschuler, 1979; Bibas, 2003), the U.S. Supreme Court officially established the
constitutionality of plea bargaining in 1970, deeming that the practice was not inherently
coercive (Brady v. United States, 1970).
In traditional guilty pleas, defendants admit their guilt and waive their right to a trial in
exchange for a reduced sentence and/or a reduction of charges (Brady v. United States, 1970;
Redlich et al., 2017a). However, not all plea bargains require a concession of guilt; the majority
of U.S. states permit prosecutors to offer no contest pleas, for which a defendant neither admits
nor denies guilt but instead does not contest it, and Alford pleas, for which a defendant maintains
his innocence while entering a guilty plea in exchange for a lessened sentence (Bibas, 2003;
Zottoli et al., 2019). The mere existence of no-contest and Alford pleas demonstrate that factual
guilt is not a prerequisite for an offer or acceptance of a guilty plea (Redlich et al., 2017b).
Exoneration records provide evidence that innocent defendants can be convinced to
waive their right to trial. As of May 2020, the National Registry of Exonerations documented
530 exonerees who pleaded guilty, representing 20% of all recorded exonerations. Of the 367
DNA exonerations catalogued by the Innocence Project, approximately 11% settled their cases
with guilty pleas (Innocence Project, 2020). Among a sample of youth and adults who pleaded
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guilty to felonies in New York City, 27% and 19%, respectively, claim to be innocent of all
charges (Zottoli et al., 2016). These numbers demonstrate the problematic nature of the Supreme
Court’s decision: innocent individuals pleading guilty establishes that plea bargains can be
coercive.
Given that almost all criminal cases are adjudicated with plea bargains, including cases in
which the defendant is innocent, it is critical to gain a better understanding of the circumstances
under which criminal defendants waive their right to a trial in favor of a plea deal. The following
studies contribute to the growing body of psychological research on plea bargaining by exploring
extralegal variables that may influence defendants’ plea decisions. This set of studies uses two
distinct research paradigms to examine whether deceptive interrogation techniques, which are
designed to implicitly and explicitly communicate inaccurate information about the seriousness
of a crime and the severity of potential punishments, influence subsequent plea decisions by
altering defendants’ predictions about likely trial outcomes. The present studies also examine
why guilty defendants are more likely to plead guilty than innocent defendants, even when they
have similar trial prospects. I test the hypothesis that anxiety moderates the effect of culpability
on plea decisions by leading to heightened risk aversion among guilty, but not innocent,
participants. These studies are the first to test the downstream effects of interrogation techniques
on defendants’ plea bargain decisions in the absence of a confession, and they have the potential
to reveal the psychological mechanisms responsible for differences between innocent and guilty
defendants.

2

Chapter 2: Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Trial
Plea discounts, or the reductions in sentences and charges that prosecutors offer in
exchange for guilty pleas, are often substantial and vary in magnitude between cases and
jurisdictions. There are no explicit federal restrictions on the magnitude of plea discounts
permitted. At the federal level, defendants who plead guilty receive an average sentence
reduction of 39%. These federal plea discounts vary widely between charge types, ranging from
an average sentence reduction of 25% for drug trafficking charges to 58% for larceny and theft
charges (Kim, 2015). Only three U.S. states include language in their legislation that discusses
limits to sentence discounts offered in exchange for a guilty plea, and New York State is the only
state that provides explicit restrictions on the magnitude of plea discounts (Zottoli et al., 2019).
Despite these restrictions, defendants who pleaded guilty to felony and misdemeanor crimes in
New York between 2008 and 2012 received an average sentencing discount of 67% (Yan &
Bushway, 2018). In a New York City sample, the reduction was even larger; on average youth
received a 98% reduction and adults received a 77% reduction in sentences in exchange for a
guilty plea (Zottoli et al., 2016).
To better understand the wide variation in plea discounts, legal scholars have developed
an economic model, coined the “bargaining in the shadow of the trial” model, to predict plea
discounts offered and accepted (Cooter et al., 1982). This model, referred to hereinafter as the
“shadow model,” posits that plea decisions are made in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.
The shadow model predicts that defendants make plea decisions based on the sentence that they
would receive at trial, weighted by their probability of conviction at trial (Bibas, 2004; Mnookin
& Kornhauser, 1979). For example, if a defendant faces a criminal sentence of 10 years in
prison and has an 80% chance of conviction at trial, the shadow model predicts that a rational
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defendant would accept a maximum prison sentence of 8 years (80% of 10 years) in exchange
for a guilty plea. Moreover, as stronger evidence of culpability results in a greater chance of
conviction in trial, the strength of the incriminating evidence should predict plea deals offered
and accepted.
There is some empirical and archival evidence that supports the shadow model; both
mock (McAllister & Bregman, 1986b) and real (Bordens & Bassett, 1985) defendants’ plea
decisions were influenced by both the estimated probability of conviction and the severity of the
sentence at trial. However, defense attorneys, both mock (McAllister & Bregman, 1986a) and
real (Kramer et al., 2007), considered probability of conviction but not sentence severity when
making their plea recommendations. The strength of the evidence influenced attorney predictions
of probability of conviction such that attorneys projected that cases with stronger incriminating
evidence would have a greater likelihood of conviction at trial (Bushway et al., 2014). In a
sample of real cases that were resolved through plea deals (Bushway & Redlich, 2012), the
average plea sentence was approximately equal to the average predicted sentence at trial
weighted by the average predicted probability of conviction, providing support for the shadow
model. However, the model did not accurately predict plea decisions on an individual level.
Although the abovementioned empirical evidence lends support for the theory that plea
decisions are influenced by probability of conviction and sentence severity, the model’s inability
to predict individual-level decisions in real cases suggests the presence of other influential
variables. Although convicted felons who had accepted guilty pleas cited conviction probability
and potential sentence as important factors in their decisions, participants also reported being
swayed by other factors, such as pressure from the prosecutor and defense attorney (Bordens &
Bassett, 1985). The shadow model has been subject to scrutiny from legal scholars who contend
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that it oversimplifies a complex process that involves several actors, each of whom experience
pressure from various sources, and ignores other influential extralegal factors (Bibas, 2004;
Stuntz, 2004).
The present research addresses two significant shortcomings of the shadow model. First,
the model’s predictive ability hinges on the accurate quantification of a defendant’s probability
of conviction. The shadow model, as well as research testing the model, rests on the assumption
that the defendant enters plea negotiations with accurate information pertaining to his trial
prospects. In many empirical studies, participants were provided with an exact likelihood of
conviction (McAllister & Bregman, 1986a; 1986b; Kramer et al., 2007) or an extensive record of
the case facts (Bushway et al., 2014). However, it is possible that real defendants receive
information that falsely portrays the case evidence or inaccurately represents their probability of
conviction at trial. One avenue through which a defendant receives both explicit and implied
information about their case is the investigating officers during an interrogation. Given that
police officers are permitted to use deceptive interrogation tactics, it is possible that these tactics
may skew a defendant’s perceptions of their trial prospects. Moreover, due to the limits of Brady
requirements and time limits on plea offers, defense attorneys may not have access to accurate
case information that they would need to correct the defendant’s misperceptions (Brady v.
Maryland, 1963; Redlich et al., 2017b). Biased perceptions of trial prospects resulting from
deceptive police interrogation techniques may be one factor that could explain additional
variance in individual plea decisions.
Second, because the shadow model predicts that plea decisions are based solely on trial
prospects, it follows that culpability should not influence plea decisions; an innocent and a guilty
individual with identical trial prospects should make the same plea decision. However, guilty
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defendants are more likely to accept plea deals than innocent defendants (Bordens, 1984; Tor et
al., 2010). It is possible innocent individuals frame their plea decisions differently than do guilty
individuals and that this difference in decision-framing influences the likelihood a defendant will
demonstrate risk seeking (i.e. going to trial) or risk averse behavior (i.e. pleading guilty).
Gaining a better understanding of the psychological mechanisms responsible for differences
between innocent and guilty individuals will help improve predictions about individual-level
plea decisions.
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Chapter 3: Pragmatic Implication of Interrogation Techniques
In recent decades, the prevalence of exonerations of innocent individuals who were
convicted based on false confessions has shed light on the coercive nature of commonly used
police interrogation tactics. These manipulative and deceptive tactics have been extensively
documented, classified, and studied by psychologists, criminologists, and legal scholars (Drizin
& Leo, 2003; Kassin et al., 2010; Leo, 1996; Madon et al., 2019). There exists substantial
empirical and anecdotal evidence that many interrogation tactics can elicit false confessions (for
review, see Madon et al., 2019). Furthermore, these false confessions have significant
downstream effects on the criminal investigation and trial, as they bias subsequent evidence
evaluation and jury verdicts (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Kassin & Neumann, 1997). However,
researchers have not explored the downstream consequences of the interrogation tactics in the
absence of a confession. It is possible that coercive interrogation techniques have significant
negative impacts on criminal cases even when they do not produce a false confession.
One of the most prevalent police interrogation techniques is known as the Reid technique,
developed in the 1940s by John Reid and Fred Inbau (Inbau et al. 2013). The technique is
inherently guilt-presumptive and is designed to induce anxiety in criminal suspects (Kassin et al.,
2010). It is difficult to determine the actual prevalence of these tactics, but observational and
survey data suggest that many police officers use Reid-style techniques during interrogations
(Kassin et al., 2007; Leo, 1996).
Many of the techniques outlined by the Reid manual are broadly referred to as
“minimization” and “maximization.” Minimization refers to a package of interrogation
techniques designed to minimize the seriousness of the offense and offer face-saving excuses or
moral justification for the crime. These tactics are intended to “lull the suspect into a false sense
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of security” (Kassin & McNall, 1991, p. 235; Kelly et al., 2019). Police officers are not permitted
to make explicit promises of leniency, but minimization techniques are designed to imply that
suspects will be treated more leniently if they admit guilt. The Reid manual recommends
developing a theme that helps provide suspects with moral justification for the crime. These
themes often involve placing blame on external pressures and downplaying the suspects’
culpability. Common themes include peer pressure, provocation, sexual impulses, or the
accidental nature of the offense in question. For example, the Reid manual recommends
minimizing a rape by blaming the victim: “Joe, no woman should be on the street alone at night
looking as sexy as she did…If she hadn’t gone around dressed like that you wouldn’t be in this
room now” (Inbau et al, 2013, p. 221)
In contrast, maximization techniques are designed to intimidate the suspect by
exaggerating the seriousness of the charges and the strength of the incriminating evidence. The
goal of maximization techniques is to communicate to the suspect that the investigator is
unequivocally convinced of the suspect’s guilt and that further assertions of innocence are
useless (Kassin et al., 2010). Maximization techniques overstate the seriousness of the situation
by exaggerating the heinousness of the crime and the severity of the charges.
Investigators are also legally permitted to present false evidence to the suspect. Police
officers in one case informed a murder suspect that they had a wealth of evidence incriminating
him: his shoes matched the footprints at the crime scene, his fingerprints were on the murder
weapon, the victim’s blood was found on his pants, and an eyewitness placed him at the scene
(State v. Jackson, 1983). In light of this evidence, the suspect confessed but later recanted when
he discovered that the police reports were fabricated. Although the defendant appealed his
conviction, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that false evidence, unlike explicit promises
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of leniency, did not constitute a coercive tactic and the confession was valid (State v. Jackson,
1983). False evidence is included in the package of maximization techniques as it exaggerates
the suspects’ likelihood of conviction by suggesting the prosecution strong evidence of suspect
guilt.
With the exception of the presentation of false evidence, minimization and maximization
techniques do not involve explicit deception. The goal of these interrogations tactics is to imply
the likelihood of certain consequences, rather than to express explicit threats or promises. The
interrogator wants to communicate that the suspect will receive harsher punishment if he does
not confess or that he will receive leniency if he does (Horgan et al., 2012). Because the officer
is not allowed make explicit statements about punishment, he communicates through pragmatic
implication (Kassin & McNall,1991; Luke & Alceste, 2020; Redlich et al., 2019).
A pragmatic implication is a statement that leads the hearer to believe or expect
something that is neither explicitly stated nor logically implied (Harris & Monaco, 1978). The
statement “Kathy is taller than Mary” logically implies that “Mary is shorter than Kathy,” as one
necessarily follows from the other. A pragmatic implication, by contrast, exists when a statement
leads the hearer to expect something that is not stated. For example, the statement “the fugitive
was able to leave the country” would likely lead the hearer to infer that the fugitive left the
country. However, this conclusion does not follow necessarily from the original statement; it is
possible that the fugitive was able to leave the country but did not do so (Harris & Monaco,
1978). That the fugitive left the country is pragmatically implied by the original statement. A
more common example is the question “do you know the time?” People are generally able to
look beyond the literal meaning of the question and correctly infer that the questioner wants to
know the time.
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Given how frequently people encounter pragmatic implication during everyday
communication, the tendency to infer leniency or threat during an interrogation is unsurprising.
Social psychologists have demonstrated that the pragmatic implication of minimization and
maximization techniques are interpreted as though they were explicit promises or threats. Kassin
and McNall (1991) asked participants to read interrogation transcripts in which the questioning
tactics varied. When the interrogators employed maximization techniques, participants expected
the suspect to face harsher punishment than when these techniques were not used; when they
employed minimization techniques, participants expected more leniency if the suspect confessed.
Most important, participants inferred the same amount of leniency when the police employed
minimization tactics as when the explicitly promised more lenient punishment. Thus, although
the statement “I can’t help you if you don’t tell me the truth” is semantically different from “tell
me the truth and I will see to it that the judge goes easy on you,” a suspect will interpret them to
mean the same thing.
Pragmatically implied promises and threats, along with the presentation of false evidence,
are commonly used techniques designed to help investigators obtain admissions of guilt.
Previous research has focused on the extent to which these techniques elicit confessions, both
false and true (Horgan et al., 2012). However, it is possible that these interrogation techniques
have detrimental effects on defendant outcomes in the absence of a confession. Through
pragmatic implication, minimization communicates to a defendant that if he does not confess, he
should anticipate a greater chance of conviction or a lengthier sentence should he be convicted.
Maximization also increases suspects expectations of harsh treatment in court by exaggerating
the seriousness of the crime and providing misinformation about the existence of incriminating
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evidence. By inflating a suspects’ expectations of negative outcomes at trial, minimization and
maximization may increase the likelihood a suspect opts to plead guilty in lieu of a jury trial.

11

Chapter 4: Inadequate Safeguards against Uninformed (or Misinformed) Guilty Pleas
The U.S. Supreme Court has expressed the opinion that the presence of counsel
effectively protects a defendant from coercion during interrogations and plea processes due to
the presence of counsel (Brady v. United States 1970; Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). Implied in
these statements is that a defense attorney will be able to correct for any misinformation that is
explicitly or implicitly communicated during interactions with the police or prosecutors and
therefore help a defendant render an objective plea decision. However, due to variations in the
quality of legal representation available to many criminal defendants, time constraints placed on
plea decisions, and the lack of federal pre-plea disclosure requirements, many defendants may
not receive corrected case information and therefore may be forced to rely on misinformation
they obtained during the interrogation when making their plea decision.
Quality and Quantity of Legal Advisement
Many defense lawyers are court-appointed public defenders with heavy caseloads and
may not have sufficient time and resources to extensively evaluate a case prior to making a
recommendation regarding a plea deal (Bibas, 2004). Among a sample of convicted offenders in
New York City who had entered guilty pleas, over 20% of juvenile offenders reported meeting
with their defense attorney only once before accepting the plea (Zottoli et al., 2016). Plea offers
are frequently presented by a district attorney on the morning of trial, and defense attorneys
report spending on average less than 40 minutes discussing the plea deal with their clients
(Fountain & Woolard, 2019).
Not only do defense attorneys lack adequate time and resources to provide their clients
with well-informed recommendations, defendants may also not trust their attorney to provide
knowledgeable counsel. Although adult defendants met with their attorneys significantly more
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often than did youth defendants in the New York City sample, many did not perceive their
attorney favorably: over 40% rated their attorney as incompetent or untrustworthy (Zottoli et al.,
2016). Given this distrust, defendants may be reluctant to heed their attorneys’ advice and be
more likely to rely on their own judgment and knowledge of the circumstances surrounding their
case.
Exploding Plea Offers
Time constraints further limit the ability of the defense attorney to gain access to relevant
information and the ability of the defendant to fact-check information gathered during an
interrogation. Many plea offers are made in the form of exploding offers, in which the defendant
has a set amount of time to accept the plea before it expires (Redlich et al., 2017b). Among the
New York City sample, 49% of youth offenders and 28% of adult offenders reported having less
than one hour to accept the plea offer (Zottoli et al., 2016).
Discovery of Evidence
Even when the defendant is not under a time constraint, plea decisions are further
complicated by a defendant’s lack of access to accurate details about his case. In Brady v.
Maryland (1963), the Supreme Court established that prosecutors are obligated to disclose any
evidence that is favorable to the defendant prior to trial and that failure to do so violates the
defendant’s right to due process. This rule applies to both impeachment evidence (i.e., evidence
indicating that a witness statement was not credible) and exculpatory evidence (i.e., evidence that
indicates that the defendant did not commit the crime of which he has been accused). Thus, if
any false evidence is presented to the defendant during an interrogation and the defendant then
chooses to go to trial, Brady requirements should theoretically correct for this misinformation
before trial.
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However, Brady disclosure requirements have not been extended to the plea process. In
2002, the Court held that the prosecution is not required to disclose impeachment evidence to the
defendant prior to a plea bargain, and they did not weigh in on pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory
evidence (Ruiz v. United States, 2002). The Court recently denied a petition to hear a case in
which a teenager falsely pleaded guilty because prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory
surveillance footage (Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, TX., 2019), again deferring the decision
about disclosure requirements to local jurisdictions.
Although some jurisdictions adhere to an “open-file” model, requiring prosecutors to
disclose evidence early in the criminal process, other jurisdictions give the prosecution discretion
as to what evidence they share and when they share it (Gregory, 2011; Turner & Redlich, 2016).
Only 11 states include specific language in their legislation that refers to prosecutors’ obligations
regarding exculpatory evidence in plea procedures (Zottoli, 2019). Given that many police and
prosecutors are not required to disclose evidence before making a plea deal, any information
regarding the strength of the evidence or a defendant’s probability of conviction that is implicitly
or explicitly communicated to the defendant during an interrogation may remain uncorrected
during the plea process.
To summarize, it can be assumed that in many cases: defendants do not spend much time
consulting with their attorneys; attorneys have minimal time and resources to devote to their
cases; both defendants and attorneys may be under the time pressure of an exploding plea; and
neither defendants nor the attorneys have sufficient knowledge of the existing evidence.
Therefore, defendants who receive inaccurate information regarding their probability of
conviction and the severity of their potential sentence may not have sufficient time to consult
with a lawyer or have access to accurate case information before making a plea decision. In such
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circumstances, defendants must rely on the information that is available, such as information
gathered from an interrogation, which may not be predictive of trial prospects.
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Chapter 5: The Relationship between Guilt and Anxiety
In addition to making the potentially erroneous assumption that defendants are wellinformed about the factors that influence their trial prospects, the shadow model fails to account
for differences between guilty and innocent defendants. According to the model, factual guilt
should not influence plea decisions; a guilty defendant and an innocent defendant with the same
trial prospects should make the same plea decision. However, innocent defendants are
consistently less likely to accept plea deals than are guilty defendants, even when faced with
similar trial outcomes (Bordens, 1985; Henderson & Levett, 2018; Schneider & Zottoli, 2019;
Tor et al., 2010). The present studies test two potential hypotheses that may help explain this
disparity in guilty pleas.
Differences in Decision Framing
The way defendants frame their potential choices may account for the difference in the
rates at which guilty and innocent defendants plead guilty (Redlich et al., 2017b; Tor et al.,
2010). Upon being offered a plea, defendants must choose between two outcomes: the plea deal,
in which the outcome is certain, and a jury trial, in which the outcome is uncertain (Bushway &
Redlich, 2012). Prospect theory posits that people frame their risk decisions in terms of the
predicted value of the ultimate gains or losses associated with the risk. Perceived gains tend to
increase risk aversion whereas perceived losses tend to increase risk seeking (Kühberger, 1998;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
In a classic experimental test of prospect theory, participants read a hypothetical scenario
in which an outbreak of a disease was estimated to kill 600 people (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981). Participants chose between two proposed solutions to the outbreak. Half of the
participants were asked to choose between 1) a program that would save 200 people and 2) a
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program that yielded a ⅓ probability that 600 people would be saved and a ⅔ probability that
nobody would be saved. The other half of participants were asked to choose between: A) a
program that would result in the death of 400 people and B) a program that yielded a ⅓
probability that nobody will die, and a ⅔ probability that 600 people will die. These two choices,
although semantically different, represent identical choices: options 1 and A both result in 200
people living and 400 dying, whereas options 2 and B both result in a ⅓ chance of everyone
surviving and a ⅔ chance of everyone dying. Although the options for both decisions produced
identical outcomes, the framing of the consequences influenced participants’ decisions. When
the choice was framed as a gain (i.e., number of lives saved), participants were risk averse,
choosing to save 200 people. When the choice was framed as a loss (i.e., number of lives lost),
participants were risk seeking, choosing the program with a ⅓ chance of saving everyone
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Guilt status may influence how defendants frame plea offers. Guilty defendants may
perceive punishment to be the natural consequence of their illegal actions, which would suggest
that offers of more lenient sentences represent a gain. Innocent defendants, in contrast, may not
accept punishment as an appropriate consequence given that they did not engage in illegal
behavior and may thus perceive even a lenient punishment as a loss (Redlich et al., 2017b; Tor
et. al, 2010). If the framing of a plea decision does in fact vary as a function of culpability, then
guilty defendants can be expected to demonstrate risk aversion and therefore be more likely to
accept a plea deal, and innocent defendants can be expected to demonstrate risk seeking behavior
and therefore be more likely to elect to go to trial.
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Differences in State Anxiety
An alternative explanation for the differences in plea decisions is that guilty and innocent
individuals experience different affective states during interrogations and plea negotiations.
Innocent individuals demonstrate fewer physiological signs of stress during an interrogation than
do guilty individuals (Guyll et al., 2013), suggesting that they experience less anxiety, which
could in turn influence plea decisions. Indeed, there exists substantial empirical evidence that
affective states influence judgment and decision making (Cheung & Mikels, 2011; Finucane et
al., 2000; Han et al., 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001; Starcke & Brand, 2012).
Anxiety and other fear-related emotions are defined by feelings of high uncertainty and
low control over a situation (Raghunthan & Phan, 1999). State anxiety is often experienced in
situations in which the outcome is uncertain, especially when that outcome is potentially harmful
(i.e., a police interrogation). Enhanced anxiety and fear are generally associated with risk
aversion when decisions are framed as a gain, which is hypothesized to be the result of increased
motivation to reduce uncertainty and avoid risk (Bendahan et al., 2017; Cohn et al., 2015;
Kuhnen & Knutson, 2011; Mather et al., 2009; Raghunthan & Phan, 1999). Innocent suspects
often report maintaining the naïve belief that their innocence will be discovered during the
course of the investigation (Kassin, 2005), suggesting an inflated sense of certainty in the
outcome of an interrogation. This perception of control may result in lower situational anxiety,
thus resulting in higher rates of risk taking among innocent individuals compared to guilty
individuals.
However, the abovementioned studies fail to consider the influence of incidental anxiety
and fear on decisions framed as a loss. The influence of state anxiety on risk decisions appears to
vary as a function of framing. Incidental anxiety is associated with decreased risk taking when a
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decision is framed as a gain but has no effect (Habib et al., 2015) and can even lead to increased
risk seeking behavior when a decision is framed as a loss (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Therefore,
if guilty and innocent defendants make different decisions due to differences in their framing of
the plea deal, heightened anxiety should increase risk aversion and therefore increase guilty pleas
among guilty individuals (i.e., those who frame the plea as a gain) but not among innocent
individuals (i.e., those who frame the plea as a loss). However, if the difference in plea decisions
is simply a result of differences in anxiety levels because innocent defendants experience less
anxiety than guilty defendants, induced state anxiety will affect plea rates of guilty and innocent
individuals similarly. Further, guilt will predict heightened state anxiety, which will in turn
predict a greater likelihood of a guilty plea. The present studies explore the role of anxiety in
plea decision making processes by testing if it moderates (in support of the decision framing
hypothesis) or mediates (in support of the anxiety hypothesis) the effect of guilt.
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Chapter 6. General Plan of Work
The present studies examine the influence of guilt, Reid-style interrogation techniques,
and anxiety on plea decisions. I used two distinct paradigms to test the hypothesis that the use of
minimization and maximization techniques during police interrogations indirectly increase the
likelihood of guilty pleas by biasing a defendants’ estimates of trial prospects. The studies also
explore the role that anxiety plays in the plea bargain process in an attempt to better understand
why guilty and innocent individuals make disparate plea decisions.
Study 1 uses hypothetical scenarios to examine how guilt, interrogation techniques, and
anxiety influence plea decisions in the context of a criminal case. Online participants imagined
they were either an innocent or guilty suspect in a criminal case and read interrogation transcripts
in which the questioning techniques used varied (i.e. involved minimization, implicit
maximization, false evidence, or none of these techniques). Participants made plea decisions
based on the case summary and made predictions about their potential trial outcomes. While
completing the hypothetical plea task, participants listened to audio tracks designed to elicit
either an anxious or neutral affective state. Study 1 distinguishes between implicit maximization
techniques involving pragmatic implication and the explicit presentations of false evidence to
determine if explicitly false statements about objective evidence have a greater effect on
defendants’ estimates of trial prospects and plea decisions than do statements involving
pragmatic implications. By manipulating anxiety, I was able to test whether heightened anxiety
moderated the effect of guilt on plea decisions in support of the decision framing hypothesis.
Study 2 extends Study 1 by testing the effect of guilt and interrogation techniques on plea
decisions in a scenario in which the participant’s decision has personal consequences. I adapted
Russano et al.’s (2005) mock interrogation paradigm to include a plea bargain negotiation.
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Undergraduate participants believed they were completing a brainstorming task in the lab with
another participant who was actually a confederate. They were instructed to complete half the
study collaboratively and half independently. Participants assigned to be guilty were induced to
cheat on the individual problems by the confederate. All participants were accused of cheating
and interrogated using one of three methods of questioning (control, minimization, or
maximization). They were then offered a choice between referring the case to the university’s
Academic Integrity Board for judgment of guilt and appropriate punishment (analogous to a jury
trial) or signing an admission of guilt in exchange for a lenient punishment (analogous to a plea
deal). This paradigm allows me to test the effect of the variables of interest in the context of a
plea decision with real consequences. I did not manipulate anxiety in Study 2; given the
inherently stressful nature of the cheating paradigm, I predicted that manipulating anxiety would
result in ceiling levels of anxiety among participants. Instead I measured state anxiety to
determine if it mediated the relationship between guilt and plea decisions in support of the
anxiety hypothesis.
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Chapter 7: Study 1 Methods
Participants
I recruited 840 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and paid each
participant $5. I removed 230 participants from analyses for answering one or more attention
check questions incorrectly, resulting in a final sample of 610 participants. This sample provided
me with sufficient power to detect an effect, as a sample of 558 participants is needed to detect a
small to moderate effect (f = .16) with .90 power at p = .05.
Participants ranged in age from 19 to 75 (M = 39.21, SD = 12.30). Participants
predominantly identified as female (49%) or male (50%). The majority of participants were
White (75%) and the remainder were Black or African American (9%), Hispanic or Latinx (7%),
Asian (6%), American Indian or Alaskan Native (1%), and mixed, biracial, or “other” (2%).
Design
The experiment had a 2 (guilt status: innocent vs. guilty) × 4 (interrogation techniques:
control vs. minimization vs. implicit maximization vs. false evidence) × 2 (anxiety state: nonanxious vs. anxious) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to
condition with 38-39 participants in each condition.
Materials
Case Summaries
Participants were randomly assigned to read a crime summary describing the details of a
civilian death resulting in a manslaughter charge, a traffic stop resulting in a drug possession
charge, or a restaurant fire resulting in an arson charge. This stimulus sampling allows me to
generalize the findings beyond a single set of stimuli (Wells & Windschitl, 1999). The
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summaries described the crimes as though the participant was the criminal suspect (i.e. were
written in the second person) and indicated whether the suspect was factually innocent or guilty
of the crime. The case summary also included an interrogation transcript in which interrogation
tactics were manipulated. The interrogating officer accused the suspect of committing the crime
and engaged in one of the following interrogation techniques (see Appendix A for complete
stimulus materials):
Control. The interrogating officer asked general information-gathering questions about
the crime.
Minimization. The interrogating officer minimized the seriousness of the crime (i.e.
“This could have been way worse. You could have had a lot more of the drug in your possession.
Or worse – you could have been carrying heroin or methamphetamine. But you weren’t – it’s
just a little coke, right?”), expressed understanding, and offered moral justification for the crime
(i.e. “I get it – you’re young, you like to relax and let loose after work. And why shouldn’t you?
You work hard. I can totally relate. And I bet you were just going to share some out to your
buddies, right? It’s not like you were going to go to some school and get a bunch of
impressionable kids high”)
Implicit Maximization. The interrogating officer expressed certainty in the suspects
guilt (i.e. “there’s no use denying it. We know you did it. We have no doubt about this.”) and
exaggerated the seriousness of the crime and potential punishment (i.e. “This is not going to end
well for you if you keep denying it. Drug possession is a serious offense…A jury isn’t going to
take this lightly”).
False Evidence. The interrogating officer presented false evidence but did not engage in
any other minimization or explicit maximization techniques. In the transcript for the
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manslaughter case, the interrogating officer stated that they had surveillance footage from
outside the bar that captured the bar fight. In the transcript for the drug possession case, the
officer stated that they found supplies that provided evidence that the suspect was selling drugs
(i.e. baggies and a scale). In the transcript for the arson case, the officer stated that they found
the suspect’s fingerprints at the scene.
Emotion-inducing audio track
To manipulate anxiety, participants listened to one of two audio tracks while reading the
case summary and interrogation transcript and completing the dependent measures. Participants
in the non-anxious condition listened to instrumental music. Participants in the anxious condition
listened to an audio track of traffic noises (i.e. car horns and sirens) that slowly increased in
volume. The audio track played while the participants read the crime summary and interrogation
techniques, completed the plea decision questionnaire, and completed the state anxiety measure.
Previous research has successfully manipulated affective states using audio tracks (Brooks &
Schweitzer, 2011).
Pilot Study. I conducted pilot testing to confirm that the audio tracks elicited the desired
affective state. I recruited 85 pilot participants on MTurk. Participants were randomly assigned
to listen to either the non-anxious or anxious audio track. While listening to the audio track,
participants read the case summary of the manslaughter case (innocent suspect/control
interrogation condition) and completed the state anxiety measure of the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory for Adults (STAI; Speilberger, et al., 1983). Participants in the anxious condition
reported being more anxious (M = 58.7, SD = 14.91) than did participants in the non-anxious
condition (M = 50.36, SD = 16.58), t(83) = 2.43, p = .017, d = .53, 95% CI [0.10, 0.96].
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Measures
Trait Anxiety
Participants completed the trait anxiety measure of the STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) to
confirm that baseline anxiety did not differ between participants in each anxiety condition. STAI
trait anxiety scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater levels of trait
anxiety.
Plea Decision
After reading the case summary and interrogation transcripts, participants chose between
taking their case to a jury trial or pleading guilty (see Appendix B for all Study 1 questionnaires).
Participants were informed that if they went to trial and were found guilty, they would receive
between 5 and 25 years in prison. This potential punishment was based on New York State
sentencing guidelines. If participants pleaded guilty, they would receive a definite sentence of 2
years in prison.
Pilot Study. I conducted pilot testing to calibrate plea offers to avoid ceiling and floor
effects on guilty pleas. I recruited 86 pilot participants on MTurk. Participants were randomly
assigned to read one of the three crime summaries with the control interrogation transcript and
were randomly assigned to be either innocent or guilty of the crime. Participants then were
offered the plea deal described above. Among innocent participants, 17.1% accepted the plea
offer (7.7% for manslaughter charges, 18.2% for drug possession charges, and 23.5% for arson
charges). Among guilty participants, 64.4% accepted the plea offer (50% for manslaughter
charges, 66.7% of drug possession charges, and 75% of arson charges).
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Estimated Trial Prospects
Participants then estimated their probability of conviction should they go to trial on a
scale of 0 (certain they will not be found guilty) to 100% (certain they will be found guilty).
They also estimated the sentence they would receive if they were found guilty at trial from 5 to
25 years. Estimated probability of conviction and estimated sentence were multiplied to create a
single measure of participants’ estimated trial prospects. For example, if a participant estimated a
50% chance of conviction and predicted receiving a sentence of 20 years, the participant’s
estimated trial prospects would be 10 (50% × 20 years). Estimated trial prospects could range
from 0 to 25, with higher scores indicating expectations of harsher trial outcomes.
Manipulation Check
State Anxiety. After completing the plea decision questionnaire, participants completed
the state measure of the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983). STAI state anxiety scores range from 20
to 80, with higher scores indicating greater levels of state anxiety.
Perceptions of the Interrogation. Participants indicated the extent to which they agree
with the following statements on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale:
1. The interrogating police officer put pressure on me to confess to the crime.
2. The interrogating police officer believed my statements during the interrogation.
3. The interrogating police officer was certain I was guilty of the crime
4. The interrogating police officer expressed understanding of my situation during the
interrogation
5. If I confessed to the crime during the interrogation, I would have received a more lenient
punishment.
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Attention Check
Participants completed four multiple choice questions to confirm that they attended to the
information presented in the case summary and interrogation. Participants indicated the crime for
which they were charged in the hypothetical scenario, whether they were guilty of the crime,
what sounds they heard during the course of the study, and what statements the police officer
made during the interrogation. 230 participants were removed from analysis for answering one or
more of the attention-check questions incorrectly.
Demographics
Participants provided their gender, age, highest level of education, and race or ethnicity.
Procedure
Participants were recruited from Amazon MTurk and completed the informed consent
and trait anxiety measure. They listened to a sample audio track and were instructed to adjust
their volumes to a comfortable level. They were informed that they would be asked to respond to
questions about the audio stimulus at the end of the study. Participants were instructed to read
the details of a criminal case while imagining that they were the suspect and to answer the
questions that followed the case summary as though they were personally involved in the case.
Participants read the case summary and completed the plea decision questionnaire and state
anxiety measure while listening to the emotion-inducing audio track. They then completed the
attention check, the perceptions of the interrogation questionnaire, and the demographic
questionnaire without any audio. Participants were thanked for their participation and
compensated $5.
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Hypotheses
H1. There will be a main effect of guilt, consistent with previous research. Guilty
participants will be more likely to accept a plea deal than will innocent participants.
H2. The effect of guilt will be qualified by a guilt status × anxiety interaction, such that
guilty participants will be more likely to take a guilty plea in the anxious than in the nonanxious condition. Innocent participants’ plea decisions will not differ as a function of
anxiety.
H3. There will be a main effect of interrogation techniques on guilty pleas such that
participants who are exposed to minimization and maximization techniques will view
their trial prospects more negatively and will be more likely to accept a plea deal than
will participants in the control condition. Because false evidence may be perceived as a
more objective indication of trial prospects (specifically the likelihood of conviction)
than are pragmatic implications about trial outcomes, I predicted that false evidence will
have a greater effect on estimates of trial prospects and plea decisions than will
minimization or implicit maximization.
H4. Participants’ estimates of trial prospects will mediate the hypothesized effect of
interrogation techniques on plea decisions.
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Chapter 8: Study 1 Results
Data Analytic Strategy
I analyzed continuous outcome variables (i.e., manipulation checks and estimated trial
prospects) using 2 (guilt status) × 4 (interrogation techniques) × 2 (anxiety) factorial analyses of
variance (ANOVAs). I analyzed dichotomous plea decisions using binary logistic regression
with the main effects of guilt status (with innocent as the reference group), interrogation
techniques (with control as the reference group), and anxiety (with non-anxious as the reference
group), and their interaction entered simultaneously into the model. The dichotomous outcome
was constant in one cell (100% of innocent, non-anxious participants exposed to minimization
techniques rejected the plea offer). To address this variability issue, I added half a case to each
cell (Goodman, 1970) before conducting the regression analysis. I conducted tests of simple
effects and pairwise comparison when appropriate based on a priori hypotheses or to explore
significant effects. All reported percentages are based on the original unweighted data.
To test the mediating effects of participants’ estimated trial prospects and state anxiety, I
conducted a path analysis using a bootstrap analysis in MPlus 7.0 software; Muthen & Muthen,
1998-2015). I dummy coded guilt (0 = innocent; 1 = guilty), anxiety (0 = non-anxious, 1 =
anxious), minimization interrogation techniques (0 = minimization absent, 1 = minimization
present), implicit maximization interrogation techniques (0 = implicit maximization absent; 1 =
implicit maximization present), and maximization interrogation techniques involving false
evidence (0 = false evidence absent; 1 = false evidence present). I again added half a case to each
cell before conducting the path analysis to address the variability issue associated with the
constant outcome in one cell. I also transformed the STAI variable by multiplying STAI scores
by 0.1 to control for the high levels of variance produced by the variable in its original scale.
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Manipulation Checks
Anxiety
I conducted an ANOVA on trait anxiety to test whether random assignment successfully
prevented differences in trait anxiety across experimental conditions. There was a main effect of
anxiety condition on trait anxiety such that participants in the anxious condition reported more
trait anxiety (M = 40.41, SD = 13.63) than did participants in the non-anxious condition (M =
38.04, SD = 13.54), F (1, 594) = 4.63, p = .032, d = .17, 95% CI [0.02, 0.33]. No other main
effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 1.71, ps > .165, ηp2s <.009.
To determine if anxiety condition had the intended effect on state anxiety despite
differences in baseline trait anxiety, I conducted an ANOVA on state anxiety with trait anxiety
entered as a covariate. Participants in the anxious condition reported higher rates of state anxiety
(M = 52.14, SD = 16.26) than did participants in the non-anxious condition (M = 46.43, SD =
16.91), F(1 , 593) = 13.17, p < .001, d = 0.34 , 95% CI [0.19, 0.50], confirming that the anxiety
manipulation was successful. State anxiety did not differ as a function of guilt status (innocent:
M = 50.35, SD = 16.99; guilty: M = 48.21, SD = 16.60), F (1, 593) = 2.94, p = .087, d = 0.13,
95% CI [-0.03, 0.29]. There was no main effect of interrogation techniques on state anxiety, F (3,
593) = 0.03, p = .993, ηp2 < .001, and no significant two- or three-way interactions, Fs < 0.61, p
> .560 , ηp2s < .003.
Because participants differed in trait anxiety across anxiety conditions, I ran all binary
logistic regressions and ANOVAs both with and without trait anxiety as a covariate. Including
trait anxiety did not meaningfully change results of any analyses. Further, the effect of anxiety
condition on trait anxiety was small (Cohen’s d was less than 0.2; Cohen, 1988). Therefore, all
analyses are reported without trait anxiety included as a covariate.
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Perceptions of Interrogation
Factor Analysis. I conducted a principal component analysis (PCA) with varimax
(orthogonal) rotation of the five manipulation check items about the participants’ perceptions of
the interrogation. Items 2 and 4 were reverse coded so that higher scores on each item indicated
more negative perceptions of the interrogation (i.e., a stronger perception that the police did not
express understanding of or believe the suspect). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of .63
indicates mediocre sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1974), and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was
significant (χ2 (10) = 361.70, p < .001). The PCA yielded two factors with eigenvalues over
Kaiser’s criterion of 1. Four items (items #1-4) had factor loadings of .57 or above on the first
component. These four items were averaged to create a single 7-point measure of perceptions of
interrogator opposition, with higher scores indicating greater perceived opposition (i.e. officer
disbelieved suspects’ statements, lacked understanding, exerted pressure to confess, and
expressed certainty in suspects’ guilt) during the interrogation. Question 5, participants’
expectations of leniency in exchange for a confession, loaded on the second component with a
factor loading of .96. I conducted two ANOVAs on perceptions of interrogator opposition and
expectations of leniency in exchange for a confession to determine if the interrogation
manipulation was successful.
Perceptions of Interrogator Opposition. As expected, there was a main effect of police
interrogation techniques on participants’ perceptions of interrogator opposition, F (1, 594) =
89.46, p < .001, ηp2= .311. Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons revealed that participants exposed
to implicit maximization techniques rated interrogator opposition higher (M = 6.71, SD = 0.51)
than did those exposed to control (M = 5.95, SD = 0.94), p < .001, d = 1.00, 95% CI [1.00, 1.23],
minimization (M = 5.34, SD = 0.72) p < .001, d = 2.20, 95% CI [1.97, 2.42], and false evidence
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(M = 6.16, SD = 0.79) p < .001, d = 0.83, 95% CI [0.60, 1.05]. Participants exposed to false
evidence rated interrogator opposition higher than did those exposed to minimization techniques,
p < .001, d = 1.09, 95% CI [.86, 1.32], but did not differ significantly from those in the control
interrogation condition, p = .061, d = 0.24, 95% CI [.02, 0.47]. Those exposed to the control
interrogation techniques perceived interrogator opposition to be higher than those exposed to
minimization techniques, p < .001, d = 0.73, 95% CI [0.50, 0.95].
There was also a main effect of guilt such that innocent participants rated interrogator
opposition higher (M = 6.17, SD = 0.87) than did guilty participants (M = 5.91, SD = 0.91), F (1,
594) = 17.61, p < .001, d = 0.28, 95% CI [0.12, 0.44]. Finally, there was a main effect of anxiety
condition such that non-anxious participants rated the interrogator opposition higher (M = 6.11,
SD = 0.84) than did anxious participants (M = 5.97, SD = 0.94), F (1, 594) = 17.61, p = .014, d =
.16, 95% CI [0.00, .032]. None of the two- or three-way interactions reached significance, Fs <
2.40, ps > .067, ηp2s < .012.
Expectations of Leniency in Exchange for a Confession. There was also a main effect
of interrogation techniques on participants’ expectations of leniency in exchange for a
confession, F (1, 594) = 3.38, p = .018, ηp2= .017. Participants exposed to minimization had
greater expectations of leniency (M = 4.49, SD = 2.02) than did participants exposed to control
interrogation techniques (M = 3.90, SD = 1.96), p = .036, d = 0.30, 95% CI [0.08, 0.53].
Participants exposed to implicit maximization (M = 4.50, SD = 2.00) also expected greater
leniency than did those exposed to control techniques, p = .033, d = .31, 95% CI [0.08, .053].
Perceptions of leniency did not differ between participants in the minimization and implicit
maximization conditions, p = 1.00, d = 0.00, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.22]. Participants in the false
evidence condition did not differ in their expectations of leniency (M = 4.21, SD = 1.76) from
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participants in the control, p = .489, d = 0.17, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.39], minimization, p = .574, d =
0.15, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.38], or implicit maximization p = .555, d = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.38]
conditions. No other main effects nor interactions reached significance, Fs < 1.75, ps > .156, ηp2s
< .009.
These analyses provide evidence that the interrogation manipulation was successful. As
expected, implicit maximization increased perceptions of interrogator opposition through
expressed disbelief in the suspects statements and implications about the severity of the crime
and potential punishment. Minimization decreased perceptions of interrogator opposition through
expressions of understanding and offers of justification for the crime. Both minimization and
implicit maximization increased participants expectations of leniency in exchange for a
confession, demonstrating the effect of the pragmatic implication involved in these interrogation
techniques. It is unsurprising that participants exposed to false evidence did not perceive the
interrogation differently than those in the control condition, as the false evidence interrogation
did not involve implications about leniency or exaggerations about the severity of the crime.
Participants’ likely believed the false evidence was factual case evidence and therefore did not
perceive the presentation of this evidence as a sign of police opposition. Although guilt and
anxiety also affected perceptions of the interrogation, the lack of significant interactions with
interrogation type confirm that the effect of interrogation techniques on perceptions of the
interrogation was similar across guilt and anxiety conditions.
Plea Decisions
Forty-three percent of participants accepted the plea offer. The rates of guilty pleas by
condition are presented in Table 1, and results of the binary logistic regression on plea decisions
are presented in Table 2. There was a main effect of guilt status in support of Hypothesis 1 and
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Table 1
Study 1 Plea Descriptive Statistics
Guilt condition
Innocent
Guilty
Anxiety condition Interrogation technique
n
%
n
%
Non-anxious
Control
39
26%
38
66%
Minimization
38
8%
38
68%
Implicit maximization
38
0%
38
68%
False evidence
38
18%
38
82%
Total
153 13% 152 71%
Anxious
Control
38
13%
38
82%
Minimization
38
16%
38
76%
Implicit maximization
38
13%
38
66%
False evidence
39
10%
38
71%
Total
153 13% 152 74%
Total
Control
77
20%
76
74%
Minimization
77
12%
76
72%
Implicit maximization
76
7%
76
67%
False evidence
77
14%
76
76%
Total
306 13% 304 72%
Note. Descriptive statistics for accepted guilty pleas only.

Total
n
77
76
76
76
305
76
76
76
77
305
153
152
152
153
610

%
46%
38%
34%
50%
42%
47%
46%
40%
40%
43%
46%
42%
37%
45%
43%

consistent with previous research, χ2 = (1, N = 642) = 151.52, p < .001. The odds that
participants pleaded guilty was over 5 times greater when they were guilty than when they were
innocent. The main effect of anxiety on plea decisions was not significant, χ2 = (1, N = 642) =
.894, p = .344. I predicted that the effect of guilt status would be qualified by a guilt status ×
anxiety interaction such that manipulated anxiety would increase guilty pleas among guilty but
not among innocent participants. The interaction effect was not significant, χ2 = (1, N = 642) =
.176, p = .675. I conducted follow-up tests of simple effects based on my a priori hypothesis.
Anxiety did not affect the rate of guilty pleas among innocent, χ2 (1, N = 642) = 0.71, p = .401,
OR = 1.129, 95% CI [0.69, 1.85] nor guilty participants, χ2 (1, N = 642) = 0.23, p = .630, OR =
1.37, 95% CI [0.64, 2.91].
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Table 2
Study 1 Effects of Manipulated Variables on Guilty Pleas

Variables in the equation

B
1.62
-0.73

SE
0.48
0.57

Wald
11.24
1.67

p
.001
.196

OR
5.07
0.48

95% CI for OR
Lower Upper
1.96
13.08
0.16
1.46

Guilt
Anxiety
Interrogation type
Minimization
-1.19 0.63 3.55 .060 0.30
0.09
1.05
Implicit maximization
-2.66 1.07 6.16 .013 0.07
0.01
0.57
False evidence
-0.38 0.53 0.52 .470 0.68
0.24
1.93
Guilt × anxiety
1.50 0.77 3.83 .050* 4.48
1.00
20.08
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
1.31 0.79 2.72 .099 3.69
0.78
17.4
Guilt × maximization
2.77 1.17 5.59 .018 15.99 1.61 159.07
Guilt × false evidence
1.15 0.74 2.42 .120 3.16
0.74
13.46
Anxiety × interrogation
Anxiety × minimization
1.38 0.88 2.46 .117 3.97
0.71
22.18
Anxiety × maximization
2.60 1.24 4.59 .032 14.3
1.25 163.06
Anxiety × false evidence
0.14 0.84 0.03 .864 1.15
0.22
5.98
Guilt × anxiety × interrogation
Guilt × anxiety × minimization
-1.77 1.13 2.46 .117 0.17
0.02
1.56
Guilt × anxiety × maximization
-3.54 1.43 6.17 .013 0.03
0.00
0.48
Guilt × anxiety × false evidence
-1.45 1.12 1.69 .194 0.24
0.03
2.09
Note. * p = .0504; CI = confidence interval; OR = odds ratio; All variables were
simultaneously entered into the logistic regression equation. All df = 1, N = 610. Dummy
codes of predictors were guilt = 1; anxious = 1; minimization = 1; implicit maximization = 1;
false evidence = 1.
I hypothesized that there would be a main effect of interrogation conditions on plea
decisions such that all Reid-style interrogation techniques would lead to a greater rate of
accepted plea deals compared to the control condition. The overall main effect did not reach
significance, χ2 = (3, N = 642) = 5.914, p = .116. Based on my a priori hypothesis I explored
comparisons between interrogation condition. The regression model indicated that among
innocent, non-anxious participants, those exposed to implicit maximization were significantly
less likely to plead guilty than were those exposed to control interrogation techniques. Neither
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minimization nor false evidence produced a change in the rate of guilty pleas compared to the
control condition.
I also predicted that false evidence would increase guilty pleas to a greater degree than
minimization and implicit maximization. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that implicit
maximization resulted in a decreased rate of guilty pleas compared to both control, p = .020, OR
= 0.44, 95% CI [0.22, 0.88], and false evidence techniques, p = .044, OR = 0.48, 95% CI [0.24,
0.98]. Guilty plea rates did not differ significantly between implicit maximization and
minimization conditions, p = .146, OR = 0.59, 95% CI [0.29, 1.20]. The rate of guilty pleas
among participants exposed to false evidence did not differ significantly from the rate of guilty
pleas among participants exposed to control, p = .724, OR = 0.91, 95% CI [0.52, 1.57], or
minimization techniques, p = .497, OR = 1.22, 95% CI [0.69, 2.16], nor did guilty plea rates
differ between those exposed to minimization and control techniques, p = .295, OR = 0.74, 95%
CI [.43, 1.30] (See Figure 1).

Figure 1
Percent Guilty Pleas by Condition (Study 1)
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Guilty

There was not a significant interaction between guilt and interrogation techniques, χ2 =
(3, N = 642) = 2.07, p = .558, nor a significant interaction between anxiety and interrogation
techniques, χ2 = (3, N = 642) = 5.48, p = .140, on plea decisions. The three-way interaction also
did not reach significance, χ2 = (3, N = 642) = 6.70, p = .082.
Estimated Trial Prospects
There was a significant main effect of guilt on participants’ estimates of trial prospects
(see Table 3 for descriptive statistics). Guilty participants predicted worse trial prospects (M =
7.03, SD = 4.88) than did innocent participants (M = 4.14, SD = 4.57), F(1, 594) = 57.77, p <
.001, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.45, 0.77]. I predicted that participants exposed to minimization,
Table 3
Study 1 Estimated Trial Prospects Descriptive Statistics

Anxiety
condition
Non-anxious

Guilt condition
Innocent
Guilty
n
M (SD)
n
M (SD)

Interrogation
technique
Control
39
5.2 (6.43)
38
5.19 (4.52)
Minimization
38 2.88 (4.24)
38
6.52 (3.5)
Implicit
maximization
38 3.46 (3.25)
38
7.63 (5.29)
False evidence
38 4.67 (3.97)
38
8.55 (5.16)
Total
153 4.06 (4.69) 152
6.97 (4.8)
Anxious
Control
38 4.16 (4.93)
38
6.26 (3.54)
Minimization
38 3.87 (4.67)
38
6.99 (5.59)
Implicit
maximization
38 4.12 (4.42)
38
7.37 (4.49)
False evidence
39 4.69 (3.97)
38
7.72 (6.01)
Total
153 4.21 (4.47) 152 7.09 (4.98)
Total
Control
77 4.68 (5.72)
76
5.72 (4.07)
Minimization
77 3.37 (4.46)
76
6.76 (4.64)
Implicit
maximization
76 3.79 (3.86)
76
7.50 (4.88)
False evidence
77 4.68 (3.94)
76
8.14 (5.58)
Total
306 4.14 (4.57) 304 7.03 (4.88)
Note. n = cell sample size; M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
37

n

Total
M (SD)

77
76

5.19 (5.53)
4.7 (4.27)

76
76
305
76
76

5.55 (4.84)
6.61 (4.98)
5.51 (4.95)
5.21 (4.39)
5.43 (5.35)

76
77
305
153
152

5.75 (4.72)
6.19 (5.27)
5.64 (4.94)
5.2 (4.98)
5.07 (4.84)

152
153
610

5.65 (4.76)
6.4 (5.11)
5.58 (4.94)

Figure 2
Guilt × Interrogation Interaction on Estimated Trial Prospects (Study 1)
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implicit maximization, and false evidence would predict harsher trial prospects than participants
exposed to control interrogation tactics. There was not a significant main effect of interrogation
tactics on estimated trial prospects, F(1, 594) = 2.52, p = .057, ηp2 = .013, but there was a
significant interaction between interrogation tactics and guilt in partial support of this hypothesis,
F(3, 594) = 2.66, p = .047, ηp2= .013 (see Figure 2). Among guilty participants there was a
simple main effect of interrogation techniques, F (3, 594) = 3.69, p = .012, ηp2 = 007. Guilty
participants estimated harsher trial outcomes when exposed to either implicit maximization, p =
.020, d = 0.40, 95% CI [0.08, 0.72], or false evidence, p = .002, d = 0.49, 95% CI [0.17, 0.81],
compared to control interrogation techniques. Estimates of trial prospects did not differ between
implicit maximization and false evidence conditions, p = .407, d = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.44].
Estimates of trial prospects among participants exposed to minimization did not differ
significantly from the other three conditions (control, p = .176, d = 0.24, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.56];
implicit maximization, p = .330, d = 0.16, 95% CI [-.16, .48]; false evidence, p = .072, d = 0.27,
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Figure 3
Representation of the Significant Direct and Indirect Effects of Guilt Status, Interrogation
Techniques, and Anxiety Condition on Guilty Pleas (Study 1)

Note. All paths represent positive relationships.
95% CI [-0.05, 0.59]). Among innocent participants, estimates of trial prospects did not differ
across interrogation conditions, F (3, 594) = 1.48, p = .219, ηp2 = .018. No other main effects or
interactions were significant, Fs < 0.91, all ps > .437, ηp2 s < .005.
Path Analysis
Although the regression model does not provide evidence that Reid-style interrogation
techniques increase the rate of guilty pleas compared to the control condition, it is possible that
the independent variable is indirectly affecting plea decisions without evidence of a direct effect
(Kenny & Judd, 2014). I conducted a path analysis to test whether guilt status, interrogation
techniques, and anxiety, and their interactions indirectly influenced plea decisions through their
effects on estimates of trial prospects and state anxiety (see Figure 3).
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The path analysis tested Hypothesis 4, which predicted that estimated trial prospects mediate the
relationship between interrogation techniques and plea decisions. The path model also tests
whether self-reported state anxiety mediates the relationship between guilt and plea decisions.
The regression model did not provide support for my prediction that anxiety condition
differentially influences plea decisions as a function of guilt status and therefore failed to provide
evidence that innocent and guilty defendants frame plea decisions differently. Testing the
mediating effect of anxiety allowed me to test the alternative hypothesis that guilt leads to an
increase in state anxiety, which in turn leads to an increase in risk aversion and therefore an
increase in guilty pleas.
Standard path coefficients, standard error, 95% confidence intervals, and p values for all
direct effects are provided in Table 4. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, guilt directly affected guilty
pleas such that guilty participants were more likely to accept a plea than were innocent
participants. The model again failed to provide support for Hypothesis 2: guilt did not moderate
the effect of manipulated anxiety on plea decisions. There was, however, a significant direct
effect of self-reported state anxiety on plea decisions such that increased state anxiety predicted
an increased likelihood of a plea decision. The path model revealed no direct effect of any type
of interrogation technique on plea decisions compared to the control interrogation condition.
However, including mediators in the path model revealed an indirect effect of interrogation
techniques on plea decisions that was moderated by guilt status. Standard path coefficients,
standard error, 95% confidence intervals, and p values for all indirect effects are presented in
Table 5. Among guilty participants, exposure to minimization, implicit maximization, and false
evidence indirectly affected guilty pleas via their effect on estimates of trial prospects. Each style
of interrogation increased estimates of trial prospects compared to the control interrogation, and
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Table 4
Study 1 Direct Effects of Manipulated Variables and Mediators on Guilty Pleas
Dependent
variables
Plea on

Estimated trial
prospects on

95% CI for β
Lower Upper

Predictor

β

SE

Guilt
Anxiety
Interrogation type
Minimization
Implicit maximization
False evidence
Guilt × anxiety
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
Guilt × maximization
Guilt × false evidence
Anxiety × interrogation
Anxiety × minimization
Anxiety × maximization
Anxiety × false evidence
Guilt × anxiety × interrogation
Guilt × anxiety × minimization
Guilt × anxiety × maximization
Guilt × anxiety × false evidence
Estimated trial prospects
State anxiety
Guilt

1.06
-0.34

0.27
0.34

0.52
-1.01

1.60
0.32

<.001
.309

-0.41
-1.35
-0.16
0.65

0.43
1.10
0.30
0.44

-1.25
-3.51
-0.75
-0.22

0.42
0.81
0.44
1.51

.334
.222
.602
.142

0.31
1.12
0.20

0.5
1.14
0.42

-0.67
-1.13
-0.62

1.30
3.36
1.02

.536
.325
.634

0.56
1.36
-0.05

0.55
1.17
0.53

-0.51
-0.94
-1.08

1.63
3.65
0.98

.306
.250
.919

-0.74
-1.81
-0.52
0.13
0.09
-0.01

0.69
1.23
0.65
0.01
0.04
1.26

-2.10
-4.21
-1.79
0.12
0.01
-2.47

0.62
0.59
0.76
0.15
0.16
2.45

.286
.139
.429
<.001
.022
.992

Anxiety
Interrogation type
Minimization
Implicit maximization
False evidence
Guilt × anxiety
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
Guilt × maximization
Guilt × false evidence
Anxiety × interrogation
Anxiety × minimization
Anxiety × maximization
Anxiety × false evidence
Guilt × anxiety × interrogation
Guilt × anxiety × minimization
Guilt × anxiety × maximization
Guilt × anxiety × false evidence

-1.04

1.23

-3.45

1.38

.401

-2.33
-1.73
-0.54
2.12

1.24
1.1
1.17
1.57

-4.75
-3.88
-2.82
-0.96

0.09
0.42
1.76
5.19

.060
.115
.647
.177

3.68
4.20
3.87

1.59
1.57
1.60

0.57
1.11
0.73

6.79
7.28
7.01

.020
.008
.016

2.01
1.71
1.07

1.57
1.53
1.50

-1.05
-1.28
-1.87

5.08
4.70
4.00

.198
.262
.476

-2.62
-3.01
-2.98

2.19
2.08
2.10

-6.9
-7.10
-7.09

1.67
1.08
1.13

.231
.149
.155

Note. CI = confidence interval; Dummy codes of predictors were guilt = 1; anxious = 1;
minimization = 1; implicit maximization = 1; false evidence = 1.
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Table 4 Continued
Dependent
variables
State anxiety on

95% CI for β
Lower
Upper

Predictor

β

SE

p

Guilt
Anxiety
Interrogation type
Minimization
Implicit maximization
False evidence
Guilt × anxiety
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
Guilt × maximization
Guilt × false evidence
Anxiety × interrogation
Anxiety × minimization
Anxiety × maximization
Anxiety × false evidence
Guilt × anxiety × interrogation
Guilt × anxiety × minimization
Guilt × anxiety × maximization
Guilt × anxiety × false evidence

-0.30
0.42

0.39
0.40

-1.06
-0.37

0.47
1.20

.450
.301

0.05
-0.25
-0.07
-0.07

0.40
0.40
0.38
0.56

-0.73
-1.03
-0.81
-1.16

0.84
0.53
0.68
1.02

.896
.535
.856
.897

-0.11
0.02
0.10

0.57
0.54
0.527

-1.24
-1.05
-0.94

1.01
1.08
1.13

.847
.977
.855

-0.06
0.22
0.15

0.56
0.53
0.56

-1.15
-0.83
-0.95

1.03
1.26
1.24

.915
.687
.795

0.27
0.62
0.05

0.81
0.75
0.78

-1.31
-0.85
-1.48

1.84
2.09
1.59

.739
.411
.950

Note. CI = confidence interval; Dummy codes of predictors were guilt = 1; anxious = 1;
minimization = 1; implicit maximization = 1; false evidence = 1.
these inflated estimates increased the likelihood a participant would plead guilty. Thus, my
prediction that expectations about trial prospects mediate the relationship between interrogation
techniques and plea decisions was supported among guilty participants only. The effect of guilt
status on guilty pleas was not mediated by self-reported state anxiety, failing to provide support
for the alternate hypothesis that anxiety mediates the relationship between guilt and plea
decisions.
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Table 5
Study 1 Indirect Effects of Manipulated Variables on Guilty Pleas Via Estimates of Trial
Prospects and Self-Reported State Anxiety
Mediators
Plea through
estimated trial
prospects

Predictor
Guilt
Anxiety
Interrogation type
Minimization
Implicit maximization
False evidence
Guilt × anxiety
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
Guilt × maximization
Guilt × false evidence
Anxiety × interrogation
Anxiety × minimization
Anxiety × maximization
Anxiety × false evidence
Guilt × anxiety × interrogation
Guilt × anxiety × minimization
Guilt × anxiety × maximization
Guilt × anxiety × false evidence

Plea through state
anxiety

95% CI for β
Lower
Upper

β

SE

p

0.00
-0.13

0.17
0.16

-0.33
-0.46

0.33
0.19

.992
.415

-0.30
-0.22
-0.07
0.27

0.16
0.15
0.16
0.21

-0.62
-0.51
-0.37
-0.14

0.02
0.06
0.24
0.69

.068
.122
.657
.198

0.76
0.54
0.50

0.21
0.21
0.21

0.06
0.14
0.09

0.89
0.95
0.92

.025
.009
.018

0.26
0.22
0.14

0.21
0.2
0.2

-0.15
-0.18
-0.25

0.67
0.62
0.53

.210
.274
.489

-0.34
-0.39
-0.39

0.29
0.28
0.28

-0.92
-0.96
-0.94

0.24
0.16
0.34

.251
.164
.170

Guilt
-0.03
0.04
-0.10
0.04
.508
Anxiety
0.04
0.04
-0.05
0.12
.399
Interrogation type
Minimization
0.01
0.04
-0.07
0.08
.904
Implicit maximization
-0.02
0.04
-0.10
0.05
.574
False evidence
-0.01
0.04
-0.08
0.07
.870
Guilt × anxiety
-0.01
0.05
-0.11
0.10
.907
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
-0.01
0.06
-0.12
0.10
.862
Guilt × maximization
0.001
0.05
-0.10
0.10
.979
Guilt × false evidence
0.01
0.05
-0.10
0.11
.875
Anxiety × interrogation
Anxiety × minimization
-0.01
0.05
-0.11
0.10
.921
Anxiety × maximization
0.02
0.05
-0.08
0.12
.718
Anxiety × false evidence
0.01
0.15
-0.09
0.10
.815
Guilt × anxiety × interrogation
Guilt × anxiety × minimization
0.02
0.08
-0.13
0.18
.763
Guilt × anxiety × maximization
0.05
0.08
-0.10
0.20
.476
Guilt × anxiety × false evidence
0.01
0.08
-0.15
0.16
.951
Note. CI = confidence interval. Dummy codes of predictors were guilt = 1; anxious = 1; minimization = 1;
implicit maximization = 1; false evidence = 1.
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Chapter 9: Study 1 Discussion
Study 1 revealed that, as predicted, guilty participants were more likely than innocent
participants to plead guilty in exchange for a reduction in sentence. Although innocent and guilty
participants in this study were presented with identical trial prospects, guilty participants
predicted that they would fare worse at trial than did innocent participants. Thus, defendants’
estimates of their trial prospects were not consistent with their actual likelihood of conviction
and potential sentence, providing further evidence that objective trial prospects do not fully
explain plea decisions.
Based on predictions that innocent and guilty individuals frame their plea decisions
differently in terms of gains and losses, I hypothesized that manipulated anxiety would increase
guilty pleas among guilty participants (i.e., those who frame the plea decision as a gain) but not
among innocent participants (i.e., those who frame the plea decision as a loss). This hypothesis
was not supported; anxiety did not interact with guilt status to affect guilty pleas. The alternate
explanation, that guilty defendants plead guilty more often than do innocent defendants due to
higher levels of state anxiety, was also not supported. Guilty participants did not experience
higher levels of state anxiety than did innocent participants and therefore anxiety did not mediate
the relationship between guilt and plea decisions. Although none of the manipulated variables
had a direct effect on state anxiety, it is notable that higher levels of self-reported state anxiety
predicted an increase in guilty pleas. This relationship supports previous research indicating that
anxiety increases risk aversion (Bendahan et al., 2017; Cohn et al., 2015; Kuhnen & Knutson,
2011; Mather et al., 2009; Raghunthan & Phan, 1999).
It is worth noting that the anxiety manipulation may not have induced a sufficiently
strong affective reaction to affect participant behavior. Although participants exposed to the
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anxiety-inducing audio track did report higher levels of state anxiety than those exposed to
instrumental music, anxiety condition did not directly affect state anxiety when I controlled for
all independent variables and mediators in the path analysis. A stronger manipulation of anxiety
may be required to observe the effect of manipulated anxiety on plea decisions.
It is also possible that the audio tracks were not the only study stimulus that contributed
to participants’ state anxiety. Imagining oneself as a criminal defendant faced with a plea
decision may induce state anxiety, which may have minimized differences between anxious and
non-anxious participants. Both groups reported average STAI scores above 50. Some studies
have suggested that STAI state scores of 40 or above are associated with clinically significant
symptoms of anxiety, while others suggest a cutoff point of 54-55 (Julian, 2011). The STAI
manual reports that adults report average STAI state scores of approximately 35, with college
student reporting average scores of approximately 37 (Spielberger et al., 1983). Given that Study
1 participant’s average scores were at the upper bounds of these recommendations, it is possible
that all participants were experiencing heightened state anxiety in response to the case
summaries and plea decisions. If all participants were experiencing heightened state anxiety
compared to their baseline, differences in state anxiety as a result of the anxiety manipulation
may have been suppressed.
I also predicted that Reid-style interrogation techniques would increase the rate of guilty
pleas, and that this effect would be mediated by participants’ estimates of their trial prospects.
Although I predicted that this relationship would be observed regardless of guilt status, the effect
was only observed among guilty participants. Exposure to minimization, implicit maximization,
or false evidence increased estimates of trial prospects among guilty participants compared to the
control condition, which in turn predicted an increased likelihood of a guilty plea. My prediction
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that false evidence would have a stronger effect than minimization or maximization on
participants’ estimates of trial prospects and plea decisions was not supported.
Among innocent participants in the non-anxious condition, implicit maximization
paradoxically decreased the rate of plea decisions compared to the control and false evidence
interrogation conditions such that none of the participants in this condition accepted the guilty
plea. This effect may be explained by participants’ perception of the interrogation. Exposure to
implicit maximization, factual innocence, and lack of anxiety were all associated with an
increase in perceptions of interrogator opposition. It is unsurprising that innocence participants
perceived greater opposition than did guilty participants given that they likely believed the
interrogator’s accusatory statements were unjustified. Guilty participants, in comparison, may
have believed that expressions of certainty in guilt and the exerted pressure to confess were
justified given their guilt status, and therefore perceived the interrogator less negatively. The
relationship between anxiety and perceptions of the interrogator is less clear. Increases in anxiety
are related to greater perceptions of hostility and threat (Deschenes et al., 2015), which would
suggest that anxious participants would perceive greater interrogator opposition. However,
literature on state anxiety and social interaction does not explain why anxiety would decrease
participants’ perceptions of interrogator opposition. Given that the anxiety manipulation did not
have as strong an effect on state anxiety as intended, it is possible that the effect of anxiety
condition on perceptions of the interrogation was a result of sampling error.
That implicit maximization, innocence, and lack of anxiety are related to more negative
perceptions of the interrogating officer may explain why innocent, non-anxious participants
exposed to implicit maximization accept the guilty plea at such a low rate. These participants
may have been more prone than others to react defensively as a result of these negative
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perceptions. Because their plea decisions had no real consequences, online participants were free
to react defensively to the perceived police opposition by refusing to admit guilt and rejecting the
plea deal, without having to worry about consequences.
With the exception of the decrease in guilty pleas among participants who were exposed
to implicit maximization, Reid-style interrogation techniques had no effect on innocent
participants’ plea decisions or expectations about trial prospects. This lack of effect among
innocent participants demonstrates the persistence of the phenomenology of innocence. Innocent
individuals have the tendency to maintain the belief that the truth will be discovered and their
innocence will eventually be affirmed. This naïve belief often increases the likelihood that an
innocent individual will cooperate with the police and waive their rights, as they feel
invulnerable to conviction (Kassin, 2005). Interrogation techniques did not affect estimates of
trial prospects among innocent participants, demonstrating the pervasiveness of this belief.
Neither pragmatic implications about potential outcomes nor explicit presentation of
incriminating evidence shifted innocent participants expectations of potential trial outcomes.
Taken together, Study 1 results suggest that interrogation techniques indirectly increased
guilty pleas among guilty participants by increasing estimates of trial prospects. Innocent
participants’ estimates of trial prospects and plea decisions appear to be relatively insusceptible
to the effect of interrogation techniques, likely because of their strong belief in the power of their
innocence. Although state anxiety was observed to increase the likelihood of a guilty plea, no
relationship between guilt and anxiety was observed.
Study 2 tested the relationship between guilt and interrogation techniques in the context
of a plea decision that had real personal consequences. Given that hypothetical decision-making
tasks lack real consequences, Study 1 participants may have been more likely to react
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defensively to police behavior that was perceived as antagonistic than would a defendant making
an actual plea decision. Both innocent and guilty participants may be more strongly influenced
by interrogation techniques when faced with real accusations and personal consequences. Study
2 also tested the mediating effect of anxiety on plea decisions. It is possible that I did not observe
an effect of guilt on anxiety in Study 1 because participants were not actually guilty of a crime;
imagining guilt likely did not induce the same level of state anxiety as having committed a real
transgression.
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Chapter 10: Study 2 Methods
Participants
I recruited 171 undergraduate students from John Jay College of Criminal Justice to
participate in Study 2. I removed 52 participants from analysis: fourteen participants behaved in
a way inconsistent with their randomly assigned guilt status condition (i.e., refused to cheat when
prompted by the confederate or cheated when assigned to the innocent condition), four
terminated their session prior to making a plea decision, 10 failed the manipulation check, and 24
did not believe the cover story. These exclusions resulted in a final sample of 119 participants.
All participants were compensated $20. Participants who completed the study to fulfill a course
requirement also received 2 Research Experience Points.
A power analysis revealed that a sample of 206 participants was needed to detect a small
to moderate effect (f = .25) with .90 power at p = .05. Data collection was halted indefinitely due
to the university closure resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. For the purpose of this
dissertation, I analyzed data from the existing 119 participants with the understanding that my
sample lacks sufficient power to detect effects. Data collection will resume when the school reopens and the remaining 87 participants will be collected for final publication.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 26 (M = 19.7, SD = 1.9). A majority of the
participants were female (75.6%). Approximately half of the participants identified as Hispanic
or Latinx (50.4%), and the remaining participants identified as Black or African American
(19.3%), White (15.1%), Asian (10.9%), and multiracial or “other” (4.2%).
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Design
The experiment had a 2 (guilt status: innocent vs. guilty) × 3 (interrogation techniques:
control vs. minimization vs. maximization) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were
randomly assigned to condition with between 15 and 27 participants in each condition (cell ns
are reported in Table 7). Uneven cell sizes were partially a result of data collection being halted
before the full sample was collected. Due to random assignment, the number of participants
collected per cell was uneven before removing excluded participants. Furthermore, the rate of
participant exclusions varied by condition, with the highest number of data points being removed
from the innocent/maximization condition (see Table 6). The presentation of false evidence
appeared to make some innocent participants suspicious of the cheating accusations, thus
increasing the likelihood that they would disbelieve the cover story compared to participants in
other conditions. The majority of exclusions among guilty participants resulted from participants
refusing to cheat when asked or failing the manipulation check (i.e. stating that they had not
cheated). As data collection continues, I will recruit more participants for the smaller cells to
compensate for the excluded data.

Table 6
Number of Participants Excluded by Condition in Study 2
Guilt condition
Innocent
Guilty
Total
Interrogation
Total
Participants
Total
Participants
Total
Participants
technique
participants
excluded
participants
excluded
participants
excluded
Control
33
6
30
11
63
17
Minimization
21
3
24
9
45
12
Maximization
36
14
27
9
63
23
Total
90
23
81
29
171
52
Note. Total participants column indicates the total number of participants collected in each
condition prior to exclusions.
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Materials
Anxiety Prescreen Questionnaire
Students interested in participating in Study 2 completed an online prescreen
questionnaire that included the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988). Given the
inherently stressful nature of the research protocol, students who scored 36 or above on the BAI
were excluded from participation.
Brainstorming Task
Participants completed a brainstorming task with a partner. The task included eight
questions, four of which were designated “collaborative problems” to be completed with one’s
partner, and four of which were designated “individual problems” to be completed alone.
Participants were presented with categories and instructed to list four examples they believed
best fit each category (e.g. “List the four highest paying occupations in the United States”; see
Appendix C).
Filler Task
Participants then completed a filler task that involved a 5-question measure that
ostensibly measured participants’ levels of empathy. The questionnaire also included
demographic items (gender, age, year in school, and race/ethnicity; see Appendix D).
Plea Form
After participants were accused of cheating and interrogated, they were given a plea offer
and instructed to complete and sign a “report of alleged and/or resolved academic integrity
violation.” The research assistant would fill in information about the incident by hand prior to
making the plea offer (indicated by underlined, italicized font; see Appendix E). Participants
were required to select their choice of accepting the plea (i.e. admitting guilt and accepting 10
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hours of community service) or rejecting the plea (referring the case to the Academic Integrity
Committee for review). The student was also required to sign and date the form to confirm their
decision.
Pilot study. I conducted pilot testing to develop the lead researcher script and calibrate
the plea offer to ensure that I avoided ceiling effects of plea acceptances among guilty
participants and floor effects of plea acceptances among innocent participants. I recruited 22
undergraduate students who ran through the entire research protocol. 50% were innocent and
50% guilty, and all were exposed to the control interrogation techniques. Eight (73%) of guilty
and two (18%) of innocent participants accepted the plea offer described above.
Plea Follow-up Form
After making a plea decision, participants completed a plea follow-up form that was
ostensibly a report of adverse events that would be sent to the university’s Research Ethics
Committee (see Appendix F). The form included measures of estimated trial prospects, state
anxiety, and perceptions of the interrogation.
Estimated Trial Prospects. Participants estimated the probability that the Academic
Integrity Committee would find them guilty on a 0 to 100% scale. Participants also estimated the
sentence they would receive if the Academic Integrity Committee found them guilty in number
of hours of community service. Estimates of sentence ranged from 0 to 100 hours of community
service. Estimated probability of guilt and estimated sentence were multiplied to create a single
measure of estimated trial prospects ranging from 0 to 100.
State Anxiety. As in Study 1, participants completed the state measure of the STAI
(Spielberger et al., 1983).
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Perceptions of the Interrogation. Participants indicated the extent to which they agree
with the following statements on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) Likert scale:
1. The research assistant put pressure on me to admit that I was responsible for the
incident in question.
2. The research assistant believed my statements during the investigation.
3. The research assistant was certain that I was guilty of the incident in question.
4. The research assistant expressed understanding of my point of view during the
investigation.
Attention Check
During debriefing, participants completed an attention check questionnaire. Participants
answered three yes/no questions about cheating behavior:
1. During the study, did the other student ask you for help on one of the individual
problems?
2. Did you give the other student answers to one or more of the individual problems?
3. Did the other student give you an answer to any of the individual problems?
Ten participants were excluded for incorrectly answering any of these items (i.e., indicated that
they did cheat when they had not or that they did not cheat when they did). The final attention
check item asked participants to indicate what statements had been made during the
interrogation. They were asked to select which of the following occurred:
1. The research assistant stated that there was evidence that I cheated on the research tasks.
2. The research assistant expressed understanding and stated that he/she also would have
cheated in the same situation.
3. The research assistant told me that the incident could go on my permanent record.
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4. The research assistant told me that the other student had reported that I shared my
answers during the task.
Participants were not removed for answering this question incorrectly as many participants
struggled to remember specific statements made during the interrogation.
Procedure
Each participant arrived in a waiting area outside the laboratory. A confederate posing as
another undergraduate participant also waited in the waiting area. A research assistant (RA),
blind to guilt status, escorted both the participant and confederate to a room in the lab designed
to resemble an interrogation room; a bare, windowless room containing a table and two chairs
(Inbau et al., 2013; Russano et al., 2005). The room was equipped with a camera hidden in a
clock to allow for surreptitious recording of research procedures to ensure consistency across
sessions.
The RA instructed both individuals to turn off their cell phones and to leave their
belongings in a designated space in the corner of the room to prevent students from accessing
their phone during the study. The RA obtained informed consent and explained that the goal of
the study is to measure how empathy is related to an individual’s ability to work collaboratively
with others. The RA instructed the participants to first work together on the collaborative
problems and then work alone on the individual problems and encouraged participants to fully
complete each problem. The RA then left the room while the participants completed the task. In
the guilty condition, the confederate asked for help on one of the individual problems. The
majority of participants complied with this request, and 12 participants who did not comply with
the request were excluded from analysis. In the innocent condition, the confederate did not speak
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to the participant during the individual section of the task. Three innocent participants initiated
cheating and were excluded from analyses.
After approximately 10 minutes, the RA returned and collected the questionnaires. She
gave the participant and confederate the filler task and left the room to ostensibly grade the
brainstorming task. After three minutes, the RA returned and informed the participants that there
appeared to be a problem with their brainstorming task and requested to speak with them
individually. She escorted the confederate from the room and returned two minutes later. The RA
informed the participant that he and the confederate wrote very similar answers to the target
problem and that this was a violation of the university’s Academic Integrity Policy. The RA then
engaged the participant in one of three types of questioning sessions (see Appendix G for
interrogation script). In the minimization condition, the RA expressed understanding and offered
justification for the incident (e.g. “I understand that the questions can be difficult;” “I’m sure you
didn’t realize it was a big deal”). In the maximization condition, the RA exaggerated the severity
of the potential punishment (e.g., “I’m sure you don’t want this going on our permanent record”.)
and provided false evidence (e.g., “The other student told us that you gave her the answer”).
Although guilty participants were factually guilty of cheating, the research assistants did not
question the confederate nor did the confederate make statements about whether cheating
occurred. The RA was blind to condition and therefore had no evidence of cheating when she
conducted the interrogation. Therefore, the statement “the other student told us you gave her the
answer” is considered false evidence even when the participant did cheat. In the control
interrogation condition, the RA made general accusatory statements and asked questions about
the incident; no minimization or maximization was used. In all conditions the RA recommended
that the participant not admit to cheating because she was required to include any statements
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made by the participant in her report of the incident. This warning was designed to emulate
Miranda warnings and discourage participants from confessing to cheating so as to avoid ceiling
effects on guilty pleas, as 100% of guilty confessors plead guilty during early versions of pilot
testing. All interrogation scripts were similar in length.
After the interrogation, the RA left the room to ostensibly discuss the situation with the
graduate student in charge of the study. Another research assistant playing the role of the
graduate student entered the room and made the plea offer. He reiterated the seriousness of the
situation and gave the participant the choice between referring the case to the Academic Integrity
Board or filing an official admission of guilt. If the participant chose the former option, the
Academic Integrity Board ostensibly would review the facts of the case, make a determination
about the students’ guilt, and decide on a punishment if the student was found guilty. The
graduate student explained that the university sentencing guidelines require that the Board
administer a punishment of between 40 and 80 hours of community service, which would
involve custodial work at the university, for a student deemed guilty of academic dishonesty. If
the participant chose to admit guilt, he would forgo the board review, sign a statement conceding
that he cheated, and agree to perform 10 hours of community service. The graduate student
clarified that the participant would not be expelled and the incident would not go on the
participants’ permanent record, regardless of his choice (see Appendix H for plea offer script).
Participants made their decision and signed the plea form. If participants refused to sign the
form, the lead researcher would ask the student to verbally confirm that they understood that
failure to sign the form would lead to automatic referral to the Academic Integrity Board.
Students who refused to sign and verbally confirmed that their case would go to the Board were
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coded as having rejected the plea offer. The offer was not referred to as a “plea deal” at any point
during the study to avoid participants guessing the hypotheses or research questions.
After completing the plea form, the researcher provided the participant with the plea
follow-up form. The lead researcher explained that the university’s Research Ethics Committee
required all researchers to report any adverse events that occur during research studies, and that
the form was anonymous and would not be shared with the Academic Integrity Board or affect
the outcome of their case in any way. After the participant completed the plea follow-up form,
the graduate student informed the participant that he would still be compensated and asked him
to wait for the RA to return and pay him.
The lead researcher then entered the room and probed for suspicion to determine if the
participant believed the cover story or had any predictions about my research question and
hypotheses. The researcher then disclosed the deception and administered the attention check
questionnaire. She then explained the purpose of the study and addressed any questions or
concerns. Finally, the researcher compensated the participant in cash and awarded research credit
when applicable.
Hypotheses
H1. There will be a main effect of guilt consistent with Study 1 and previous research.
Guilty participants will plead guilty more often than innocent participants.
H2. Anxiety will mediate the relationship between guilt and plea decisions. Guilty
participants will report higher levels of stat anxiety, and these heightened levels of
anxiety will in turn predict a greater rate of guilty pleas.
H3. There will be a main effect of interrogation techniques on guilty pleas such that
participants who are exposed to minimization and maximization techniques will view
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their trial prospects more negatively and will be more likely to accept a plea deal than
will participants in the control condition.
H4. Participants’ estimates of trial prospects will mediate the hypothesized effect of
interrogation techniques on plea decisions.
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Chapter 11: Study 2 Results
Data Analytic Strategy
I analyzed continuous outcome variables using 2 (guilt status) x 3 (interrogation
techniques) ANOVAs. I analyzed participants’ plea decisions using binary logistic regression
with main effects of guilt status (with innocent as the reference group), interrogation techniques
(with control as the reference group), and their interaction entered simultaneously into the model.
As in Study 1, the dichotomous outcome was constant in one cell (100% of guilty participants
exposed to maximization techniques plead guilty). I again added half a case to each cell before
conducting the regression analysis. I conducted tests of simple effects and pairwise comparisons
when appropriate.
I tested the mediating effects of participants’ estimates of trial prospects and state anxiety
by conducting a path analysis using a bootstrap analysis in MPlus 7.0 software; Muthen &
Muthen, 1998-2015). I dummy coded guilt (0 = innocent, 1 = guilty), minimization techniques (0
= minimization absent, 1 = minimization present) and maximization techniques (0 =
maximization absent, 1 = maximization present). I again transformed STAI scores by multiplying
scores by 0.1 to address variance issues.
Manipulation Check
Factor Analysis
I conducted a PCA with varimax (orthogonal) rotation of the four manipulation check
items about participants’ perceptions of the interrogation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of
.61 indicates mediocre sampling adequacy (Kaiser, 1974), and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity
was significant (χ2 (6) = 91.541, p < .001). The PCA yielded one factor with an eigenvalue over
Kaiser’s criterion of 1. All four items had factor loadings of .70 or above. These four items were
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averaged to create a single 7-point measure of perceptions of interrogator opposition, with higher
scores indicating greater perceived opposition during the interrogation.
Perceptions of Interrogator Opposition
There was a main effect of interrogation techniques on perceptions of interrogator
opposition, but this effect only reached marginal significance, F (2, 112) = 2.41, p = .094, ηp2 =
.041. Pairwise comparisons reveal that participants perceived greater interrogator opposition
when exposed to maximization (M = 4.33, SD = 0.97) compared to control techniques (M = 3.78,
SD = 1.32), but this effect also only reached marginal significance, p = .094, d = 0.46, 95% CI[0.03, 0.89]. Perceptions of interrogator opposition did not differ between participants exposed to
minimization condition (M = 4.24,SD =1.20) and either control, p = .214, d = 0.36, 95% CI [-.10,
.82], or maximization techniques, p = .953, d = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.39, 0.55]. Neither the main
effect of guilt, F (1, 112) = 0.68, p = 410, d = 0.14, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.51], nor the interaction
between guilt and interrogation techniques, F (2, 112) = 0.28, p = .755, ηp2 = .005, reached
significance. These findings provide evidence that maximization increased perceptions of
interrogator opposition as intended. That the effects only reached marginal significance may be
due to the small sample size. Minimization did not decrease perceptions of interrogator
opposition as it did in Study 1. This lack of effect may also be due to the small sample size. It is
also possible that participants perceived the researcher who made the plea offer to be adversarial,
which may have minimized the attenuating effect of minimization.
Plea Decisions
Across all conditions, 47% of participants accepted the plea offer. The rates of guilty
pleas by condition are presented in Table 7 and results of the regression model are presented in
Table 8. As in Study 1, guilt status had a significant effect on plea decisions χ2 (1, N = 131) =
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Table 7
Study 2 Plea Descriptive Statistics
Guilt condition
Innocent
Guilty
Interrogation technique
n
%
n
%
Control
27
30%
19
79%
Minimization
18
6%
15
73%
Maximization
22
14%
18
100%
Total
67
13%
52
71%
Note. Descriptive statistics for accepted guilty pleas only.

Total
n
46
33
40
119

%
50%
36%
52%
47%

Table 8
Study 2 Effects of Manipulated Variables on Guilty Pleas

Variables in the equation

B
-1.96

SE
0.65

Wald
9.08

p
.003

OR
0.14

95% CI for OR
Lower Upper
0.04
0.50

Guilt
Interrogation type
Minimization
1.40 0.85 2.73 .098 4.05
0.77
21.28
Maximization
0.81 0.68 0.14 .232 2.25
0.26
8.52
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
-1.11 1.12 0.98 .323 0.33
0.04
2.98
Guilt × maximization
-2.59 1.33 3.78 .052 0.08
0.01
1.02
Note. CI = confidence interval; OR = odds ratio; All variables were simultaneously entered
into the logistic regression equation. All df = 1, N = 610. Dummy codes of predictors were
guilt = 1; minimization = 1; maximization = 1.
35.16, p < .001. The odds that a participant would accept a guilty plea was over seven times
greater for guilty participants than innocent participants. The main effect of interrogation
techniques did not reach significance, χ2 (2, N = 131) = 3.70, p = .157. Based on my a priori
hypothesis that minimization and maximization would yield higher rates of guilty pleas
compared to the control interrogation condition, I explored comparisons of plea decisions

between interrogation conditions. Neither minimization nor maximization predicted an increase
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Table 9
Study 2 Estimated Trial Prospects Descriptive Statistics

Interrogation technique
Control
Minimization
Maximization
Total

Guilt condition
Innocent
Guilty
n
M (SD)
n
M (SD)
11.29
28.75
25
18
(21.36)
(23.25)
7.22
16.67
18
12
(11.40)
(15.86)
2.05
25.35
22
18
(5.50)
(23.34)
7.03
24.42
65
48
(15.20)
(21.78)

n
43
30
40
113

Total
M (SD)
18.60
(23.57)
11.00
(13.92)
12.53
(19.79)
14.43
(20.15)

in the likelihood of a guilty plea compared to the control condition (see Figure 4). The
interaction between guilt and maximization techniques also did not reach significance, χ2 (2, N =
131) = 3.99, p = .136.

Figure 4
Percent Guilty Pleas by Condition (Study 2)
100

Percent Guilty Pleas

90
80
70
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50

Minimization

40

Maximization

30
20
10
0

Innocent

Guilty
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Estimates of Trial Prospects
I predicted that both minimization and maximization would increase participants’
estimates of trial prospects compared to the control group. Mean estimates of trial prospects by
condition are presented in Table 9. Six participants chose not to answer the trial prospects
measures. My hypothesis was not supported; the main effect of interrogation techniques was not
significant, F (2, 107) = 2.06, p = .133, ηp2 = .037. There was a main effect of guilt status such
that guilty participants predicted worse trial prospects (M = 24.45, SD = 21.78) than innocent
participants (M = 7.03, SD = 15.20), F (2, 107) = 22.97, p < .001, d = 0.95, 95% CI [0.58, 1.33].
The interaction between guilt and interrogation techniques was not significant, F (2, 107) = 1.22,
p = .299, ηp2 = .022. \

Figure 5
Representation of the Significant Direct Effects of Guilt Status and Interrogation Techniques on
Estimates of Trial Prospects, State Anxiety, and Guilty Pleas (Study 2)

Note. Solid lines represent positive relationships; dotted lines represent negative relationships.
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Table 10
Study 2 Direct Effects of Manipulated Variables and Mediators on Guilty Pleas
95% CI for β
Dependent
variables
Plea on

Estimated trial
prospects on

Predictor
Guilt
Interrogation type
Minimization
Maximization
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
Guilt × maximization
Estimated trial prospects
State anxiety
Guilt
Interrogation type
Minimization
Maximization
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
Guilt × maximization

β
1.03

SE
0.57

Lower
-0.01

Upper
2.15

p
.074

-0.99
-0.40

0.59
1.01

-2.14
-2.38

0.17
1.57

.093
.689

1.02
4.90
0.02
0.06

1.29
2.45
0.01
0.11

-1.52
0.10
-0.01
-0.15

3.56
9.70
0.04
0.27

.431
.045
.172
.573

17.46

6.80

4.13

30.79

.010

-4.07
-0.92

0.49
4.38

-13.75
-17.82

5.61
-0.66

.410
.035

-8.01
5.84

8.75
8.53

-25.16
-10.88

9.14
22.56

.360
.490

State anxiety on

Guilt
0.40
0.49
-0.56
1.37
.415
Interrogation type
Minimization
-0.07
0.37
-0.80
0.66
.845
Maximization
-0.10
0.45
-0.98
0.79
.831
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
-0.14
0.6
-1.31
1.03
.816
Guilt × maximization
0.64
0.64
-0.61
1.69
.319
Note. CI = confidence interval; Dummy codes of predictors were guilt = 1; minimization = 1;
maximization = 1.
Anxiety
To determine if the present study supported previous findings indicating that guilty
participants demonstrate more anxiety than do innocent participants, I compared self-reported
state anxiety across groups. There was a main effect of guilt on anxiety such that guilty
participants reported higher levels of anxiety (M = 57.55, SD = 13.20) than did innocent
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Table 11
Study 2 Indirect Effects of Manipulated Variables on Guilty Pleas Via Estimates of Trial
Prospects and Self-Reported State Anxiety
Mediators
Plea through
estimated trial
prospects

Predictor
Guilt
Interrogation type
Minimization
Maximization
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
Guilt × maximization

95% CI for β
Lower Upper

β

SE

0.29

0.33

-0.36

1.01

0.381

-0.07
-0.15

0.10
0.09

-0.26
-0.32

0.13
0.01

0.500
0.072

-0.13
0.10

0.29
0.19

-0.71
-0.28

0.44
0.47

0.648
0.612

Plea through
state anxiety

Guilt
0.02
0.07
-0.12
0.16
Interrogation type
Minimization
0.00
0.05
-0.09
0.08
Maximization
-0.01
0.05
-0.11
0.10
Guilt × interrogation
Guilt × minimization
-0.01
0.07
-0.14
0.13
Guilt × maximization
0.04
0.11
-0.17
0.24
Note. CI = confidence interval. Dummy codes of predictors were guilt = 1; anxious = 1;
minimization = 1; implicit maximization = 1; false evidence = 1.

p

0.739
0.924
0.914
0.904
0.719

participants (M = 51.73, SD = 13.91), F (1, 111) = 4.93, p = .028, d = 0.43, 95% CI [0.06, 0.80].
There was not a significant effect of interrogations, F (2, 111) = .663, p = .518, ηp2 = 012, or
significant interaction, F (2, 111) = .870, p = .422, ηp2 = 015.
Path Analysis
As in Study 1, I conducted a path analysis to test whether 1) estimated trial prospects
mediated the relationship between interrogation techniques and plea decisions and 2) state
anxiety mediated the relationship between guilt and plea decisions (see Figure 5). Standard path
coefficients, standard error, 95% confidence intervals, and p values for all direct effects are
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provided in Table 10. There was a direct effect of guilt on estimated trial prospects such that
guilty participants predicted harsher trial prospects than innocent. There was also a direct effect
of maximization on estimated trial prospects in the direction opposite my predictions:
participants exposed to maximization predicted less harsh trial prospects than those exposed to
control interrogation techniques. Contrary to hypotheses, guilt and interrogation techniques did
not directly affect plea decisions. However, the effect of maximization was moderated by guilt
such that maximization increased guilty pleas among guilty participants. No indirect effects
reached significance (see Table 11).
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Chapter 12: Study 2 Discussion
I again found that guilty participants accepted plea deals at a substantially higher rate
than did innocent participants. Guilty participants also reported higher levels of state anxiety than
did innocent participants, which is consistent with previous findings that guilty interrogation
suspects exhibited more signs of physiological stress than did innocent suspects (Guyll et al.,
2013).That this effect was observed in Study 2 but not in Study 1 highlights a limitation of
hypothetical plea paradigms: participants who imagine guilt do not experience the same affective
states as those participants who are actually guilty of a transgression.
I predicted that anxiety would mediate the relationship between guilt and plea decisions
in support of the anxiety hypothesis. I expected that the heightened anxiety experienced by guilty
participants would in turn result in a greater likelihood of a guilty plea. However, although guilt
did predict anxiety, anxiety did not affect plea decisions.
The path analysis also revealed that guilty participants predicted more severe trial
prospects compared to innocent participants, but the increased trial prospects estimates did not
mediate the relationship between guilt and plea decisions. In fact, when controlling for the
mediating effect of estimated trial prospects and state anxiety, the path analysis did not reveal a
direct or indirect effect of guilt on plea decisions. This pattern of effects is inconsistent with my
hypotheses, Study 1 results, and previous findings. It is also a surprising pattern of results given
that guilty participants pleaded guilty at a much higher rate than did those who were innocent. It
is possible that this lack of effect is a result of the lack of power due to the small sample.
The effect of interrogation techniques on plea decisions was again limited to guilty
participants and was only observed among participants who were exposed to maximization.
Maximization increased guilty pleas among guilty but not innocent participants. Indeed, 100% of
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guilty participants exposed to maximization pleaded guilty. This ceiling rate of pleas might
suggest that the implicit statements about severity of punishment and the presentation of false
evidence led participants to believe that they had little no chance of being acquitted by the
academic integrity board. However, participants’ estimates of trial prospects did not differ as a
function of interrogation techniques, nor did these estimates mediate the direct effect of the
interact between minimization and guilt on pleas.
In fact, maximization directly affected estimates of trial prospects such that participants
exposed to maximization estimated less severe trial outcomes than those exposed to control
interrogation techniques. Although not moderated by guilt condition, it is possible that this effect
was driven by the innocent participants’ expectations of trial prospects. Estimates of trial
prospects were lowest among innocent participants exposed to maximization. Perhaps innocent
participants did not believe the false evidence that the other participant had reported cheating to
the research assistant. Students may find it difficult to believe that another student would
fabricate a story about cheating when none had occurred. If the participant disbelieves the
information about evidence being provided by the interrogator, they will likely also disbelieve
threats of punishment. Again, it important to note that, given that the sample is smaller than that
required by the power analysis, these results should be interpreted cautiously. More data will be
collected before definitive conclusions are drawn.
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Chapter 13: General Discussion
Because most criminal cases are resolved through plea bargaining, the identification of
extralegal variables that could hinder a defendant’s ability to make objective plea decisions is
crucial for establishing the extent to which the plea-bargaining system is coercive. The
bargaining in the shadow of a trial model oversimplifies the plea process, which limits its
usefulness in predicting individual-level plea decisions. The model wrongly assumes that
defendants have access to accurate information about their trial prospects and fails to account for
differences between innocent and guilty individuals. The present studies shed light on how
factors beyond objective trial prospects may unfairly influence plea decisions.
The Effect of Interrogations on Guilty Pleas
One goal of the present studies was to understand how the misinformation that is
communicated to a suspect during an interrogation biases later plea decisions. In both studies,
Reid-style interrogation techniques increased rates of plea acceptances, but only among guilty
defendants. Among participants making hypothetical plea decisions in Study 1, interrogation
techniques did not directly affect guilty pleas of all participants equally. When a defendant was
guilty, however, minimization, implicit maximization, and false evidence all inflated
participants’ estimates of the severity of their potential trial prospects, which in turn increased
the likelihood a participant accepted the plea offer. Among participants making a plea decision
with real consequences in Study 2, maximization techniques (which included both implicit
statements and false evidence) increased the likelihood of a guilty pleas among guilty
participants. However, unlike in Study 1, this effect was not mediated by trial prospects. Taken
together, information explicitly and implicitly communicated during an interrogation appears to
increase the likelihood of a guilty pleas among guilty, but not innocent, defendants.
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Contrary to my prediction, explicit statements about incriminating evidence did not have
a larger effect on plea decisions than did implicitly communicated information about potential
trial outcomes. In Study 1, false evidence did not result in greater estimates of trial prospects or
more guilty pleas than did implicit maximization. These findings support previous research
indicating that implications about the seriousness of the crime and severity of punishment are
interpreted as though they are explicit threats (Kassin & McNall, 1991).
Although false evidence may not have a stronger effect than implicit maximization, it is
possible that combining interrogating techniques may have a cumulative effect on defendant
decisions. Although all three types of interrogation techniques had similar effects on guilty
participants in Study 1, only maximization influenced guilty participants decisions in Study 2.
Study 2 maximization involved both implicit statements about potential trial outcomes and the
explicit presentation of false evidence. It is possible that using the two styles of questioning had
a cumulative effect on plea decisions that was stronger than the effect of implicit statements
alone. Indeed, the Reid manual (Inbau et al., 2013) recommends that interrogators use a
combination of both minimization and maximization during interrogations. Interrogations that
combine multiple Reid-style techniques illicit more false confessions than interrogations that use
only one technique (Russano et al., 2005). It is very possible that an interrogation that combines
minimization, implicit maximization, and the presentation of false evidence will inflate trial
prospect estimates and increase the rate of guilty pleas to a greater extent than would an
interrogation that relies solely on one style of interrogation tactic.
Furthermore, participants in the present studies read a brief 3-page excerpt from an
interrogation transcript or were engaged in a brief questioning session (approximately two to
four minutes in length). Real interrogations are substantially longer. According to self-report
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data from a sample of American police investigators, the average interrogation lasts 1.6 hours
(Kassin et al., 2007). There are numerous documented cases of interrogations that lasted upwards
of 24 hours (Drizin & Leo, 2004). It is therefore likely that real interrogations involve
significantly more statements of minimization and maximization than did the interrogations in
the present studies. Future research could explore whether effect of interrogation techniques on
trial outcome estimates varies as a function of the quantity of minimizing and maximizing
statements made during an interrogation and whether the techniques have a cumulative effect on
plea bargains when used together.
Although Reid-style interrogation techniques influenced the decisions of guilty
participants across both studies, plea decisions among innocent individuals were largely
unaffected by the harmful effects of interrogation tactics. These participants’ estimates of trial
prospects and plea decisions demonstrated the persistence of the phenomenology of innocence:
innocent defendants’ predictions about trial prospects were unaffected and their rate of guilty
pleas was not increased regardless of the questioning tactics used. Indeed, there was some
evidence in Study 1 that when innocent individuals were in the non-anxious condition, implicit
maximization actually decreased the likelihood of a guilty plea compared to control interrogation
techniques. However, it may be that this effect is limited to hypothetical plea tasks that do not
have real consequences.
The Relationship between Guilt and Anxiety
A second goal of the studies was to test competing hypotheses about why guilty and
innocent defendants accept guilty pleas at different rates. The decision framing hypothesis
posited that guilty individuals frame a plea decision in terms of gains, which leads to a greater
likelihood of risk aversion (resulting in an accepted plea offer), whereas innocent individuals
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frame a plea deal in terms of loss, leading to a greater likelihood of risk seeking (resulting in a
rejected plea offer). Given that anxiety increases risk aversion in the gain but not the loss frame,
I predicted that manipulating anxiety would increase guilty pleas among guilty but not among
innocent defendants. However, Study 1 failed to provide evidence for the decision framing
hypothesis. Both guilt and measured state anxiety predicted guilty pleas, but guilt did not interact
with manipulated anxiety to effect plea decisions. Perhaps this lack of effect was a result of the
ineffectiveness of the anxiety manipulation. Although participants exposed to anxiety-inducing
stimuli reported more state anxiety than did participants who were not, the direct effect of
manipulated anxiety on state anxiety did not reach significance when controlling for other
independent and mediating variables in the path analysis. Therefore, it would be useful to retest
this hypothesis with a stronger anxiety manipulation or to develop a different test of decision
framing to better understand the differences between innocent and guilty defendants.
The alternative anxiety hypothesis posited that differences in plea decisions are simply a
result of differences in levels of state anxiety: guilty and innocent defendants frame the plea
decision similarly, but the heightened anxiety experienced by guilty defendants leads to more
risk aversion and therefore more guilty pleas. Thus, state anxiety should mediate the effect of
guilt on plea decisions. The path analyses in both studies failed to provide evidence for this
mediation. However, guilty participants reported more state anxiety than did innocent
participants in Study 2, and increased state anxiety predicted an increased likelihood of guilty
pleas in Study 1. It is possible that Study 1 guilty participants failed to exhibit the anticipated
heightened anxiety due to the hypothetical nature of the task; hypothetical guilt likely does not
induce the same affective state as does actual guilt. Therefore, the lack of anxiety experienced by
guilty participants in Study 1 did not allow for a test of the full mediation. True guilt in Study 2
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did effectively induce state anxiety, but its mediating effect on guilty pleas did not reach
significance. However, it is possible that with the collection of more data and greater power to
detect this effect, Study 2 will provide support of the anxiety hypothesis.
Limitations
The primary limitation of Study 1 was the possible ineffectiveness of the anxiety
manipulation. Listening to anxiety-inducing audio tracks during an online study may not increase
state anxiety enough to influence behavior. Furthermore, although I excluded participants who
did not accurately identify what audio track they listened to, I cannot confirm that participants
listened to the audio tracks for the full duration of the study. If participants muted or the audio
track or lowered their computer volume for all or part of the study, the manipulation likely would
not have the intended effect on their affective state.
The most significant limitation of Study 2 was the small sample size. Given that data
collection was indefinitely halted due to university closures as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic, I was unable to collect the full sample I originally proposed. This limited my ability to
detect significant effects. Data collection will continue when the university reopens and
reinstates on-campus classes.
Study 2 also used a relatively homogenous sample of students between the ages of 18 and
26. Participants were required to be current undergraduate students because the consequences of
cheating were academic. Younger adults are less risk averse than older adults (Albert & Duffy,
2012) and anxiety heightens risk aversion more among older than younger adults (Mather et al.,
2009). Therefore, the plea decisions made by this sample may not represent the broader adult
population. However, given that most crime is committed by adolescents and young adults
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(National Institute of Justice, 2014), it is likely that this sample is representative of the majority
of criminal interrogation subjects.
Practical Implications and Future Directions
These studies contribute to the large body of work demonstrating that Reid-style
interrogation techniques have downstream effects on the legal outcomes of criminal defendants.
Because much of the existing research focuses on the conditions under which the questioning
tactics elicit false confessions, their detrimental effect on innocent individuals is well
documented. The present studies add to this literature by demonstrating that 1) these techniques
can influence a suspects’ subsequent decisions, even in the absence of a confession and 2) they
can lead to detrimental outcomes for guilty defendants.
Much of the interrogation literature has explored how Reid style tactics decrease the
diagnosticity of a confession, or the ratio of true confessions to false confessions. Reid-style
interrogation techniques increase the rate of false confessions, thus decreasing the diagnosticity
ratio compared to control interrogation techniques (i.e., the extent to which a confession is
diagnostic of guilt). Russano et al. (2007) argued that “with regard to the collection of confession
evidence, the goal of the criminal justice system should be to implement procedures that are
diagnostic” (p.). Given that determinations of guilt are made based on evidence, determining the
diagnosticity of a piece of evidence (such as a confession) helps jurors and prosecutors decide
how to weigh evidence when rendering a verdict or presenting a plea deal.
The present studies provide evidence that the Reid technique may actually improve the
diagnosticity of guilty pleas by increasing the rate of guilty pleas among guilty but not innocent
participants. One could argue that this improved diagnosticity is evidence that Reid-style
interrogation techniques improve plea bargaining outcomes by increasing rates of true guilty
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pleas without increasing rates of false guilty pleas. However, the purpose of a plea decision is not
to be diagnostic of guilt: no future determinations of guilt will be made based on a guilty plea.
Furthermore, that Reid-style interrogation techniques increase true guilty pleas by
inflating estimates of trial prospects suggests that these tactics hinder a defendants’ ability to
make a fully informed plea decision. The law requires that plea decisions be made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily (Godinez v. Moran, 1993), yet plea decisions may be based on
misinformation that is communicated during the course of a police interrogation. To ensure that
plea offers comply with this legal standard, plea proceedings should be designed to provide
defendants with accurate and complete information rather than to maximize true guilty pleas.
One potential strategy for increasingly the likelihood that a plea will be made knowingly
is restricting the use of the Reid technique in police interrogations. However, these techniques
can take many forms and it may be difficult for police officers and departments to measure the
prevalence of the techniques in their own interrogations. In one sample of police officers, only
11% reported having been trained in the Reid technique. Yet over 90% of this same sample
reported having used, on occasion if not more frequently, minimization or maximization
techniques (i.e. “offering the suspect sympathy, moral justifications and excuses,” “interrupting
the suspect’s denials and objections,” and “implying or pretending to have independent evidence
of guilt,”; Kassin et al., 2007). In an analysis of 29 recorded interrogations minimization was one
of the most commonly used interrogation techniques (Kelly et al., 2019). It is possible that
officers learn many of these techniques through experience and observation, and that they don’t
label them as Reid-techniques or as minimization and maximization. Police officers often report
that they learn interrogation techniques through informal on-the-job training (Cleary & Warner,
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2016). Therefore, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to identify and regulate these questioning
methods.
Given that interrogating officers will likely continue to utilize minimization and
maximization techniques, researchers and policymakers should consider methods of correcting
for misinformation that is communicated during an interrogation so as to mitigate the harmful
effect of these tactics. First, rules of discovery should be extended to the plea process so that
defendants have access to accurate information about their case. Second, states should institute
minimums on plea expiration times so as to ensure defendants and their attorneys are afforded
adequate time to review the case materials. Open-file discovery appears to aid in the plea
process: both defense attorneys and mock defendants adjust their estimates of trial prospects
when presented with case evidence (Bushway et al., 2014, Redlich et al., 2016). Furthermore,
defense attorneys report that incriminating evidence is the third most common topic they discuss
with their clients (after the specific charges and the potential sentence; Fountain & Woolard,
2018), suggesting that defense attorneys will consider case information if it is provided. More
research should be conducted to determine whether access to this information affects both
defense attorneys’ recommendations and defendants’ decisions and expectations of trial
outcomes.
Although provision of case information has the potential to improve the plea decisions, it
may not fully correct for any misinformation inferred during an interrogation. When
misinformation is implicitly communicated, it tends to be more persistent and more difficult to
correct for than when it is explicitly stated (Rich & Zaragoza, 2016). Therefore, misinformation
about trial prospects implicitly communicated during an interrogation may be harder to correct
for than false evidence, even when the defendant has access to comprehensive case information.
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Future research should examine the extent to which open-file discovery effectively corrects for
misinformation, and if this corrective effect varies as a function of type of misinformation (i.e.
implicit vs. explicit).
Recording interrogations, along with giving defense attorneys access to these
interrogations during discovery, could offer more opportunity to correct for misinformation
communicated during the interrogation. It may be more effective for a defense attorney to cite
the specific misinformation when they provide corrected information, compared to simply
providing the correct information without acknowledgement of the original misinformation.
Future research should also explore how knowledge of interrogation detail influences how
defense attorneys advise clients. Currently over half of U.S. states require statewide recording of
custodial interrogations, and general support for these recordings is growing (Bang et al., 2018).
Research should also explore the role of the defense attorney in the plea process.
Participants in the present studies made plea decisions without the advice of an attorney, but real
defendants have access to defense counsel that generally makes recommendations during the
plea process (Zottoli et al., 2016). Future studies could examine what information a defendant
shares with his attorney regarding the content of an interrogation, and whether a defense attorney
adjusts their plea recommendations based on this information. It is possible that a defendant will
be more likely to relay explicitly stated information about case evidence (false or otherwise) than
implicitly communicated information about trial prospects. Given that many defendants spend
little time discussing their case with their attorneys (Fountain & Woolard, 2019) and receive
exploding plea offers (Zottoli et al., 2016), it is also possible that little to no information about
the interrogation is relayed to the attorney. The defense attorney’s ability to correct for
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misinformation about trial prospects, even with the aid of open-file discovery and recorded
interrogations, may be limited by whether defendants disclose this misinformation.
Finally, although anxiety did not help explain why guilty and innocent defendants
pleaded guilty at such disparate rates, that anxiety increased the acceptance of plea deals is of
practical importance to understanding how defendants make decisions. Research on
interrogations and plea bargaining is often criticized for its failure to simulate real-life situations.
Reid and his protégés (Inbau et al., 2013) have claimed that laboratory research is artificial and
that research participants are less motivated than criminal suspects, which limits the
generalizability of the findings to real interrogations. This critique reflects an assumption that the
increased motivation of suspects and defendants in real-life interrogation and arrest situations
render them better able to make decisions unbiased by interrogator behavior. However, given
that police interrogations are designed to be inherently stress-inducing, it is possible that the
resulting anxiety would render a defendant less able to make an objective plea decision than a
research subject. Future research should continue the exploration of the influence of anxiety on
guilty pleas by using different methods for manipulating and measuring state anxiety.
Conclusion
The bargaining in the shadow of a trial model is the only behavioral economic model that
has been developed to predict guilty pleas to-date. However, its oversimplification of the plea
process limits its diagnostic ability for individual-level plea decisions. The present studies
provide evidence of the model’s shortcomings. Defendants trial prospects can be skewed by their
guilt status and the information they receive during an investigation, and these biased predictions
can in turn influence plea decisions. Further, defendants’ decision-making process can be
influenced by their affective state. Future research should continue to explore extralegal
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variables that influence the plea decision process so as to develop a more comprehensive and
predictive model of the plea decision-making process. Policymakers, law enforcement agencies,
and district attorneys should consider these extralegal variables when designing policy and
practice related to interrogation techniques, rules of discovery, and plea time limits.
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APPENDIX A
Study 1 Stimulus Materials
Case 1: Voluntary Manslaughter
Case Summary: Innocent
The following is a brief summary of the events of June 15, 2018, as you experienced them. For
the purposes of this study, you may consider this the “ground truth.” That is, the following
summary describes what actually occurred.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until one minute has elapsed.
On the evening of June 15, you arrived at Halsey’s Tavern in upstate New York at approximately
9:30pm. Between 9:30 and 11:00pm, you consumed three beers and a shot of vodka. When you
approached the bar to order the shot at approximately 10:45, you bumped into another bar
patron, who told you to “get the hell out of my face” and shoved you. After returning to your
table and consuming the shot of vodka, you noticed that there was a missed call notification on
your phone, as well as a new voice mail. You told your co-workers that you would be right back
and stepped outside to listen to the message.
While you were connecting to your voicemail, the door to the bar opened and about seven people
stumbled out, including the bar patron whom you bumped into at the bar. The people were
yelling and quickly began fighting. Although you tried to avoid the brawl, you found yourself
caught up in it when someone in the crowd was knocked into you, grabbed you by the arm, and
began punching you. To defend yourself, you threw several punches but ended up taking a blow
to the face and another to the stomach. At one point, someone thrust a blood-smeared knife
towards you, but you were able to grab their wrist, wrestle the knife away from them, and throw
it out of reach.
The bar’s bouncers came running out and broke the fight up, at which time it was discovered that
the man who had pushed you inside the bar had been stabbed and was unconscious. The police
arrived and arrested you and the remaining people who were involved in the fight.
You later discover that the stabbing victim died in the hospital, and the police suspect that you
are the one who stabbed him. They bring you into an interrogation room for questioning.
Because you are innocent, you maintain your innocence throughout the interrogation. An excerpt
from the questioning session is on the next page.
Case Summary: Guilty
The following is a brief summary of the events of June 15, 2018, as you experienced them. For
the purposes of this study, you may consider this the “ground truth.” That is, the following
summary describes what actually occurred.
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You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until one minute has elapsed.
On the evening of June 15, you arrived at Halsey’s Tavern in upstate New York at approximately
9:30pm. Between 9:30 and 11:00pm, you consumed three beers and a shot of vodka. When you
approached the bar to order the shot at approximately 10:45, you bumped into another bar
patron, who told you to “get the hell out of my face” and shoved you. After returning to your
table and consuming the shot of vodka, you noticed that there was a missed call notification on
your phone, as well as a new voice mail. You told your co-workers that you would be right back
and stepped outside to listen to the message.
While you were connecting to your voicemail, the door to the bar opened and about seven people
stumbled out, including the bar patron whom you bumped into at the bar. The people were
yelling, and quickly began fighting. Although you tried to avoid the brawl, you found yourself
caught up in it when one of the crowd was knocked into you, grabbed you by the arm, and began
punching you. To defend yourself, you threw several punches, but ended up taking a blow to the
face and another to the stomach. At one point, someone thrust a knife towards you, but you were
able to grab their wrist and twist it out of his hand. Another man lunges at you, and you thrust the
knife into his stomach.
The bar’s bouncers came running out and broke the fight up, at which time it was discovered that
the man you stabbed, who was the same man who had pushed you inside the bar, had was
unconscious. The police arrived and arrested you and the remaining people who were involved in
the fight.
You later discover that the stabbing victim died in the hospital, and the police suspect that you
are the one who stabbed him. They bring you into an interrogation room for questioning.
Although you are guilty, you maintain your innocence throughout the interrogation. An excerpt
from the questioning session is on the next page.
Interrogation Transcript: Control
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
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SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fight at Halsey’s tonight.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. What time did you get to Halsey’s Tavern?
SUSPECT: I got there around 9:30.
DETECTIVE: And how often do you go to Halsey’s?
SUSPECT: Pretty often I guess. Maybe once a week.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did you do today before you got to the
bar?
SUSPECT: I was at work until around 5:30. Then I went home, had
dinner by myself. Then I went to the bar to meet up with some
friends. A couple of my co-workers
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
SUSPECT: Yeah.
DETECTIVE: And how many drinks would you say you had?
SUSPECT: Um, I think a few beers, and one shot of vodka.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And who were you with?
SUSPECT: Two people I work with. Jack Miller and Eliza Becker.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about the fight.
SUSPECT: I had gone outside to listen to a voicemail on my phone
and was just standing outside the bar when the crowd came out.
All of a sudden there was all this yelling and fighting. I tried
to move –
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DETECTIVE: What time did this happen?
SUSPECT: I’m not totally sure – maybe around 11:15 or 11:30.
DETECTIVE: Okay. Now what else happened?
SUSPECT: So I tried to move out of the way, I didn’t want to get
involved. But some guy grabbed me and punched me, right in the
face. I had to hit him back – had to defend myself. Then I saw
some other guy near me pull out a knife. I grabbed his arm and
knocked the knife out of his hand.
DETECTIVE: Did you see what happened to the knife next?
SUSPECT: It fell on the ground. I didn’t see where it went or
what happened to it after that. The first guy was still throwing
punches.
DETECTIVE: And then what happened?
SUSPECT: Phil, the bouncer, broke up the fight. That’s when we
saw that some guy had been stabbed, lying on the ground
unconscious. I didn’t even see it happen.
DETECTIVE: Did you know the man who was stabbed?
SUSPECT: I don’t know him, but I had seen him in the bar, maybe
30 minutes before the fight broke out. He seemed drunk, I
accidentally bumped into him and he got real aggressive. Told me
to get out of his face and pushed me.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, his name is Kevin Hogan. And he didn’t
make it. He died on the way to the hospital. This is a serious
incident, so we need to get to the bottom of what happened
tonight. We need to settle this. That’s where you come in. I
want to ask you again what happened to the knife.
SUSPECT: I promise I don’t know. I didn’t see who picked it up
after it fell.
DETECTIVE: Would you be surprised if I told you that we have
reason to believe that you were the last one to hold the knife?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me. I saw the
knife but I never touched it.
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DETECTIVE: I just want to understand why this happened. I want
to give you a chance to tell me the truth.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: You were the last one who claims to have seen the
knife. We have reason to believe that it was you who stabbed the
victim. Now, it’s really important that you tell us exactly what
happened, as it happened.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: I know that it all happened really fast. There was a
lot going on. But I need you to do your best to remember all the
details, and to be completely honest with us. Now is the time
for you to tell us if you were the one to stab the victim.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know what I need from you.
I’ve got to straighten out all the facts. I want to make sure
you’re being honest with us. We’re getting a lot of conflicting
information from everyone involved in the fight, and witnesses
at the bar. I want to give you a chance to tell your side of the
story, to clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. You know, get the truth in the open, so we can
understand what’s really going on here. We believe that you may
have been the one who stabbed Kevin.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t kill him.
DETECTIVE: We need more information from you. You were there, we
weren’t. Just be straight with me here.
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
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Interrogation Transcript: Minimization
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fight at Halsey’s tonight.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. What time did you get to Halsey’s Tavern?
SUSPECT: I got there around 9:30.
DETECTIVE: And how often do you go to Halsey’s?
SUSPECT: Pretty often I guess. Maybe once a week.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did you do today before you got to the
bar?
SUSPECT: I was at work until around 5:30. Then I went home, had
dinner by myself. Then I went to the bar to meet up with some
friends. A couple of my co-workers
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
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SUSPECT: Yeah.
DETECTIVE: And how many drinks would you say you had?
SUSPECT: Um, I think a few beers, and one shot of vodka.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And who were you with?
SUSPECT: Two people I work with. Jack Miller and Eliza Becker.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about the fight.
SUSPECT: I had gone outside to listen to a voicemail on my
phone, and was just standing outside the bar when the crowd came
out. All of a sudden there was all this yelling and fighting. I
tried to move –
DETECTIVE: What time did this happen?
SUSPECT: I’m not totally sure – maybe around 11:15 or 11:30.
DETECTIVE: Okay. Now what else happened?
SUSPECT: So I tried to move out of the way, I didn’t want to get
involved. But some guy grabbed me and punched me, right in the
face. I had to hit him back – had to defend myself. Then I saw
some other guy near me pull out a knife. I grabbed his arm and
knocked the knife out of his hand.
DETECTIVE: Did you see what happened to the knife next?
SUSPECT: It fell on the ground. I didn’t see where it went or
what happened to it after that. The first guy was still throwing
punches.
DETECTIVE: And then what happened?
SUSPECT: Phil, the bouncer, broke up the fight. That’s when we
saw that some guy had been stabbed, lying on the ground
unconscious. I didn’t even see it happen.
DETECTIVE: Did you know the man who was stabbed?
SUSPECT: I don’t know him, but I had seen him in the bar, maybe
30 minutes before the fight broke out. He seemed drunk, I
accidentally bumped into him and he got real aggressive. Told me
to get out of his face and pushed me.
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DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, his name is Kevin Hogan. And he didn’t
make it. He died on the way to the hospital. This is a serious
incident, so we need to get to the bottom of what happened
tonight. We need to settle this. That’s where you come in. I
want to ask you again what happened to the knife.
SUSPECT: I promise I don’t know. I didn’t see who picked it up
after it fell.
DETECTIVE: Would you be surprised if I told you that we have
reason to believe that you were the last one to hold the knife?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me. I saw the
knife but I never touched it.
DETECTIVE: I just want to understand why this happened. I want
to give you a chance to tell me the truth. This is the way I see
it. This could have been way worse. You were defending yourself.
You didn’t start the fight. You tried to avoid it, but you
really had no choice. It was an accident We just want to get a
clear picture of exactly what happened.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: I just mean I get why you would do it. Kevin clearly
wasn’t a saint. It sounds to me like he was asking for it. He
deserved what he got. He was being really aggressive, and I
don’t blame you for fighting back. Who knows what would have
happened to you if you hadn’t defended yourself. You could be
the one lying in a hospital bed.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: I don’t think you wanted to hurt anyone. You’re not
some crazed killer, not some psychopath. You just got caught up
in a bad situation. You were protecting yourself from a
dangerous guy.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know where I stand. Like I
said, you weren’t out to hurt anyone, to kill anyone. This guy
was drunk, he put you in danger. You were just protecting
yourself, and I get that. I probably would have done the same
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thing in your shoes. I want to give you a chance to tell your
side of the story, to clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. You know, get the truth in the open, so we can
understand what’s really going on here. I want to know if I’m
right that you’re not the kind of person who would hurt anyone
intentionally. If you cooperate and come clean, maybe we can
help you out.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t kill him.
DETECTIVE: I’m on your side here. Just be straight with me. Tell
me the truth.
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
Interrogation Transcript: Implicit Maximization
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.

SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
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DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fight at Halsey’s tonight.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. What time did you get to Halsey’s Tavern?
SUSPECT: I got there around 9:30.
DETECTIVE: And how often do you go to Halsey’s?
SUSPECT: Pretty often I guess. Maybe once a week.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did you do today before you got to the
bar?
SUSPECT: I was at work until around 5:30. Then I went home, had
dinner by myself. Then I went to the bar to meet up with some
friends. A couple of my co-workers
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
SUSPECT: Yeah.
DETECTIVE: And how many drinks would you say you had?
SUSPECT: Um, I think a few beers, and one shot of vodka.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And who were you with?
SUSPECT: Two people I work with. Jack Miller and Eliza Becker.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about the fight.
SUSPECT: I had gone outside to listen to a voicemail on my
phone, and was just standing outside the bar when the crowd came
out. All of a sudden there was all this yelling and fighting. I
tried to move –
DETECTIVE: What time did this happen?
SUSPECT: I’m not totally sure – maybe around 11:15 or 11:30.
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DETECTIVE: Okay. Now what else happened?
SUSPECT: So I tried to move out of the way, I didn’t want to get
involved. But some guy grabbed me and punched me, right in the
face. I had to hit him back – had to defend myself. Then I saw
some other guy near me pull out a knife. I grabbed his arm and
knocked the knife out of his hand.
DETECTIVE: Did you see what happened to the knife next?
SUSPECT: It fell on the ground. I didn’t see where it went or
what happened to it after that. The first guy was still throwing
punches.
DETECTIVE: And then what happened?
SUSPECT: Phil, the bouncer, broke up the fight. That’s when we
saw that some guy had been stabbed, lying on the ground
unconscious. I didn’t even see it happen.
DETECTIVE: Did you know the man who was stabbed?
SUSPECT: I don’t know him, but I had seen him in the bar, maybe
30 minutes before the fight broke out. He seemed drunk, I
accidentally bumped into him and he got real aggressive. Told me
to get out of his face and pushed me.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, his name is Kevin Hogan. And he didn’t
make it. He died on the way to the hospital. This is a serious
incident, so we need to get to the bottom of what happened
tonight. We need to settle this. That’s where you come in. I
want to ask you again what happened to the knife.
SUSPECT: I promise I don’t know. I didn’t see who picked it up
after it fell.
DETECTIVE: Would you be surprised if I told you that we have
reason to believe that you were the last one to hold the knife?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me. I saw the
knife but I never touched it.
DETECTIVE: I just want to understand why this happened. A man
died tonight. I want to give you a chance to tell me the truth.
We already know what happened. Now we just want to hear it from
you.
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SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: We know you were the one to stab Kevin Hogan outside
the bar. It’s clear to us – you were the last one who saw the
knife. I’ve never seen such an open-and-closed case.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: This is not going to end well for you if you keep
denying it. Kevin was a popular guy around here. And I’ll tell
you what – people are mad. What you did was inexcusable, and to
make matters worse, now you’re lying to us about it. A jury
isn’t going to take this lightly.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: There’s no use denying it. We know you did it. We
have no doubt about this. You killed a man, and now it’s time
for you to tell us yourself. We’re giving you a chance to clear
the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. We know you did it. Now it’s your chance to get
the truth out in the open. Admit to what you did tonight. You
killed Kevin Hogan.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t kill him.
DETECTIVE: How can you sit there and lie to us when it’s clear
what you did? I know for a fact that a judge won’t look
favorably on you lying to us.
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
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Interrogation Transcript: False Evidence
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fight at Halsey’s tonight.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. What time did you get to Halsey’s Tavern?
SUSPECT: I got there around 9:30.
DETECTIVE: And how often do you go to Halsey’s?
SUSPECT: Pretty often I guess. Maybe once a week.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did you do today before you got to the
bar?
SUSPECT: I was at work until around 5:30. Then I went home, had
dinner by myself. Then I went to the bar to meet up with some
friends. A couple of my co-workers
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
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SUSPECT: Yeah.
DETECTIVE: And how many drinks would you say you had?
SUSPECT: Um, I think a few beers, and one shot of vodka.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And who were you with?
SUSPECT: Two people I work with. Jack Miller and Eliza Becker.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about the fight.
SUSPECT: I had gone outside to listen to a voicemail on my
phone, and was just standing outside the bar when the crowd came
out. All of a sudden there was all this yelling and fighting. I
tried to move –
DETECTIVE: What time did this happen?
SUSPECT: I’m not totally sure – maybe around 11:15 or 11:30.
DETECTIVE: Okay. Now what else happened?
SUSPECT: So I tried to move out of the way, I didn’t want to get
involved. But some guy grabbed me and punched me, right in the
face. I had to hit him back – had to defend myself. Then I saw
some other guy near me pull out a knife. I grabbed his arm and
knocked the knife out of his hand.
DETECTIVE: Did you see what happened to the knife next?
SUSPECT: It fell on the ground. I didn’t see where it went or
what happened to it after that. The first guy was still throwing
punches.
DETECTIVE: And then what happened?
SUSPECT: Phil, the bouncer, broke up the fight. That’s when we
saw that some guy had been stabbed, lying on the ground
unconscious. I didn’t even see it happen.
DETECTIVE: Did you know the man who was stabbed?
SUSPECT: I don’t know him, but I had seen him in the bar, maybe
30 minutes before the fight broke out. He seemed drunk, I
accidentally bumped into him and he got real aggressive. Told me
to get out of his face and pushed me.
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DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, his name is Kevin Hogan. And he didn’t
make it. He died on the way to the hospital. This is a serious
incident, so we need to get to the bottom of what happened
tonight. We need to settle this. That’s where you come in. I
want to ask you again what happened to the knife.
SUSPECT: I promise I don’t know. I didn’t see who picked it up
after it fell.
DETECTIVE: Would you be surprised if I told you that we have
reason to believe that you were the last one to hold the knife?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me. I saw the
knife but I never touched it.
DETECTIVE: I just want to understand why this happened. A man
died tonight. I want to give you a chance to tell me the truth.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: According to our investigation, you were the last one
who saw the knife. We have reason to believe that it was you who
stabbed the victim. Now, it’s really important that you tell us
exactly what happened, as it happened.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: I know that it all happened really fast. There was a
lot going on. But I need you to do your best to remember all the
details, and to be completely honest with us. We pulled
surveillance footage from the camera outside the bar SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know what we know. We know
exactly what happened. We pulled the surveillance footage from
the camera outside the bar and saw exactly what went down. We
saw you grab the knife out of the other guys hand, and we saw
you stab Kevin in the stomach. Now, I want to give you a chance
to come clean. Clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
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DETECTIVE: Yeah. We have it on camera. We saw you do it. Now
it’s your chance to get the truth in the open; admit to what you
did tonight. You killed Kevin Hogan.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t kill him.
DETECTIVE: Video footage doesn’t lie. How can you just sit there
denying this?
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
CASE SUMMARY 2: Possession with Intent to Distribute
Case Summary: Innocent
The following is a brief summary of the events of June 15, 2018, as you experienced them. For
the purposes of this study, you may consider this the “ground truth.” That is, the following
summary describes what actually occurred.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until one minute has elapsed.
On the evening of June 15, you were working a shift as a waiter at a Luigi’s, a local Italian
restaurant in your hometown in upstate New York. You got off work at 11:30 PM and offered to
drive a coworker to his apartment on your way home. You drove through backroads, which are
often empty late at night, and accidentally rolled through a stop sign instead of coming to a
complete stop. Suddenly you saw police lights in your rearview mirror, and you pulled over to
the side of the road and rolled down your window.
The police officer approached your window and asked for your driver’s license and registration,
which you gave him. After running your license and seeing that you had multiple moving
violations on your record, he asked to search your vehicle. Not wanting to appear uncooperative,
you and your coworker got out of the car and let the officer look through your car.
The officer found a backpack in the back seat that belonged to your coworker. He opened it and
discovered a bag of cocaine. He also discovered a large stack of cash in your glove compartment
that you had earned from tips that evening at the restaurant. The officer informed you that not
only were you in possession of illegal drugs, but the large amount of cash in your possession
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suggested that you intended to sell the cocaine. You tried to explain that the drugs did not belong
to you, and that you earned the cash at work, but the officer did not believe you.
He arrested both you and your coworker on charges relating to possession of cocaine with the
intent to distribute and brings you to the police station. He separated you from your coworker
and brought you into an interrogation room for questioning. Because the drugs did not belong to
you, you maintained your innocence throughout the interrogation. An excerpt from the
questioning session is on the next page.
Case Summary: Guilty
The following is a brief summary of the events of June 15, 2018, as you experienced them. For
the purposes of this study, you may consider this the “ground truth.” That is, the following
summary describes what actually occurred.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until one minute has elapsed.
On the evening of June 15, you were working a shift as a waiter at a local Italian restaurant in
your hometown in upstate New York. You got off work at 11:30 PM and offered to drive a
coworker to his apartment on your way home. You drove through backroads, which are often
empty late at night, and accidentally rolled through a stop sign instead of coming to a complete
stop. Suddenly you saw police lights in your rearview mirror, and you pulled over to the side of
the road and rolled down your window.
The police officer approached your window and asked for your driver’s license and registration,
which you gave him. After running your license and seeing that you had multiple moving
violations on your record, he asked to search your vehicle. Not wanting to appear uncooperative,
you and your coworker got out of the car and let the officer look through your car.
The officer found your backpack in the back seat. He opened it and discovered a large bag of
cocaine. You had just picked up the drugs earlier that day from a dealer at work, and you were
going to sell them to some friends who lived in your building. He also discovered a large stack of
cash in your glove compartment that you had earned from tips that evening at the restaurant. The
officer informed you that not only were you in possession of illegal drugs, but the large amount
of cash in your possession suggested that you intended to sell the cocaine. You tried to convince
the officer that the drugs did not belong to you, and that you earned the cash at work, but the
officer did not believe you.
He arrested both you and your coworker on charges relating to possession of cocaine with the
intent to distribute and brings you to the police station. He separated you from your coworker
and brought you into an interrogation room for questioning. Although you are guilty, you
maintain your innocence throughout the interrogation. An excerpt from the questioning session is
on the next page.
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Interrogation Transcript: Control
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The drugs that the officer found.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you coming from tonight?
SUSPECT: I had just left work at Luigi’s.
DETECTIVE: Where is Luigi’s located?
SUSPECT: Downtown on Broad Street. Right near the intersection
with Main.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And where were you driving?
SUSPECT: I was driving my coworker Jack to his place. He lives
over in the Westfield Apartment Complex.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
SUSPECT: No. We had just finished a shift.
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DETECTIVE: And what time did you leave work?
SUSPECT: Um, I think it was around 11:30. 11:40 maybe.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what were you going to do at your
coworker’s home? Was there a party?
SUSPECT: No, I was just dropping him off. I was gonna go
straight home after.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about what happened when Officer
Swanson pulled you over.
SUSPECT: I guess I didn’t stop all the way at a stop sign – I
don’t know, I thought I did. But I saw his lights so I pulled
over.
DETECTIVE: What time was this happening?
SUSPECT: It was just after we left work – maybe 11:45.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And then what happened?
SUSPECT: The officer asked to search my car, and I let him. I
didn’t think there was any reason not to. But then he found a
backpack in the back seat – Jack’s backpack – I had no idea what
was inside.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did Officer Swanson find?
SUSPECT: He found a bag of drugs – coke I think. I swear I had
no idea it was there.
DETECTIVE: So he found cocaine inside the backpack that was
located in the back seat of your vehicle?
SUSPECT: Yeah, but it wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Were you under the influence of cocaine or any other
illegal drug when you were pulled over?
SUSPECT: No, not at all. I swear – we had just come from work. I
don’t use drugs.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, not only did you have illegal
narcotics in your car – the car that you own and you were
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driving – but you had a very large amount of the drug. It looks
like you had over 100 grams.
SUSPECT: I promise, I had no idea the coke was in there. It
wasn’t my backpack.
DETECTIVE: With a volume like that, we have reason to suspect
that you intended to sell the cocaine. That makes this a pretty
serious offense.
SUSPECT: What? No – no, I wasn’t. It wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Alright, well we need to figure out what’s going on.
I want to give you a chance to tell me the truth.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: The drugs were found in your car, in your backseat.
There’s no ID in the backpack to suggest that it belongs to
anyone but you. It was your car, and you were driving. Now, it’s
really important that you tell us exactly where the drugs came
from.
SUSPECT: But they weren’t DETECTIVE: I need you to be completely honest with us. Now is
the time for you to tell us if the drugs belong to you, and if
you were planning to sell them.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know what I need from you.
I’ve got to straighten out all the facts. I want to make sure
you’re being honest with us. We’re getting a lot of conflicting
information from you and your buddy. I want to give you a chance
to tell your side of the story, to clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. You know, get the truth in the open, so we can
understand what’s really going on here. We believe that these
drugs might be yours, since we found them in your car.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t mine. It -
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DETECTIVE: We need more information from you. You’re the only
one in this room who knows the truth. Did you buy the cocaine
with the intent to sell it?
SUSPECT: But it doesn’t belong to me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
Interrogation Transcript: Minimization
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The drugs that the officer found.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you coming from tonight?
SUSPECT: I had just left work at Luigi’s.
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DETECTIVE: Where is Luigi’s located?
SUSPECT: Downtown on Broad Street. Right near the intersection
with Main.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And where were you driving?
SUSPECT: I was driving my coworker Jack to his place. He lives
over in the Westfield Apartment Complex.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
SUSPECT: No. We had just finished a shift.
DETECTIVE: And what time did you leave work?
SUSPECT: Um, I think it was around 11:30. 11:40 maybe.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what were you going to do at your
coworker’s home? Was there a party?
SUSPECT: No, I was just dropping him off. I was gonna go
straight home after.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about what happened when Officer
Swanson pulled you over.
SUSPECT: I guess I didn’t stop all the way at a stop sign – I
don’t know, I thought I did. But I saw his lights so I pulled
over.
DETECTIVE: What time was this happening?
SUSPECT: It was just after we left work – maybe 11:45.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And then what happened?
SUSPECT: The officer asked to search my car, and I let him. I
didn’t think there was any reason not to. But then he found a
backpack in the back seat – Jack’s backpack – I had no idea what
was inside.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did Officer Swanson find?
SUSPECT: He found a bag of drugs – coke I think. I swear I had
no idea it was there.
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DETECTIVE: So he found cocaine inside the backpack that was
located in the back seat of your vehicle?
SUSPECT: Yeah, but it wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Were you under the influence of cocaine or any other
illegal drug when you were pulled over?
SUSPECT: No, not at all. I swear – we had just come from work. I
don’t use drugs.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, not only did you have illegal
narcotics in your car – the car that you own and you were
driving – but you had a very large amount of the drug. It looks
like you had over 100 grams.
SUSPECT: I promise, I had no idea the coke was in there. It
wasn’t my backpack.
DETECTIVE: With a volume like that, we have reason to suspect
that you intended to sell the cocaine. That makes this a pretty
serious offense.
SUSPECT: What? No – no, I wasn’t. It wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Alright, well we need to figure out what’s going on.
The drugs were found in your car, in your backseat. There’s no
ID in the backpack to suggest that it belongs to anyone but you.
I want to give you a chance to tell me the truth. This is the
way I see it. This could have been way worse. You could have had
a lot more of the drug in your possession. Or worse – you could
have been carrying heroin or methamphetamine. But you weren’t –
it’s just a little coke, right?
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: I mean I get it – you’re young, you like to relax and
let loose after work. And why shouldn’t you? You work hard. I
can totally relate. And I bet you were just going to share some
out to your buddies, right? It’s not like you were going to go
to some school and get a bunch of impressionable kids high.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: You probably didn’t even think you were doing
anything wrong. It’s not like you’re some doped-up druggie. Your
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just a normal person who likes to have fun sometimes. We just
want to get a clear picture of exactly what’s going on.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know where I stand. Like I
said, you just wanted to have some fun. Maybe make a few bucks
from some friends along the way. You’re young, you were acting
your age – I get that. I probably would have done the same thing
at your age. I want to give you a chance to tell your side of
the story, to clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. You know, get the truth in the open, so we can
understand what’s really going on here. I want to know if I’m
right that you’re not the kind of person who was trying to break
the law - you weren’t out to hurt anyone. If you cooperate and
come clean, maybe we can help you out.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t mine. It DETECTIVE: I’m on your side here. Just be straight with me. Tell
me the truth. Admit it – you bought that cocaine with the intent
to sell it.
SUSPECT: But it doesn’t belong to me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
Interrogation Transcript: Implicit Maximization
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.

103

SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The drugs that the officer found.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you coming from tonight?
SUSPECT: I had just left work at Luigi’s.
DETECTIVE: Where is Luigi’s located?
SUSPECT: Downtown on Broad Street. Right near the intersection
with Main.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And where were you driving?
SUSPECT: I was driving my coworker Jack to his place. He lives
over in the Westfield Apartment Complex.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
SUSPECT: No. We had just finished a shift.
DETECTIVE: And what time did you leave work?
SUSPECT: Um, I think it was around 11:30. 11:40 maybe.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what were you going to do at your
coworker’s home? Was there a party?
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SUSPECT: No, I was just dropping him off. I was gonna go
straight home after.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about what happened when Officer
Swanson pulled you over.
SUSPECT: I guess I didn’t stop all the way at a stop sign – I
don’t know, I thought I did. But I saw his lights so I pulled
over.
DETECTIVE: What time was this happening?
SUSPECT: It was just after we left work – maybe 11:45.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And then what happened?
SUSPECT: The officer asked to search my car, and I let him. I
didn’t think there was any reason not to. But then he found a
backpack in the back seat – Jack’s backpack – I had no idea what
was inside.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did Officer Swanson find?
SUSPECT: He found a bag of drugs – coke I think. I swear I had
no idea it was there.
DETECTIVE: So he found cocaine inside the backpack that was
located in the back seat of your vehicle?
SUSPECT: Yeah, but it wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Were you under the influence of cocaine or any other
illegal drug when you were pulled over?
SUSPECT: No, not at all. I swear – we had just come from work. I
don’t use drugs.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, not only did you have illegal
narcotics in your car – the car that you own and you were
driving – but you had a very large amount of the drug. It looks
like you had over 100 grams.
SUSPECT: I promise, I had no idea the coke was in there. It
wasn’t my backpack.
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DETECTIVE: With a volume like that, we have reason to suspect
that you intended to sell the cocaine. That makes this a pretty
serious offense.
SUSPECT: What? No – no, I wasn’t. It wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Alright, well we need to figure out what’s going on.
I want to give you a chance to tell me the truth. There’s no ID
in the backpack to suggest that it belongs to anyone but you.
You were in possession of drugs. We already know it, we just
want to hear it from you.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: We know the cocaine belonged to you. It’s clear to us
– it was in your car, the car that you were driving. I’ve never
seen such an open-and-closed case.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: This is not going to end well for you if you keep
denying it. Drug possession is a serious offense. Even worse
that you were planning to sell it. Who do you sell to,
impressionable young kids? This is inexcusable, and to make
matters worse, now you’re lying to us about it. A jury isn’t
going to take this lightly.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: There’s no use denying it. We know you did it. We
have no doubt about this. The drugs belonged to you, and you
intended to sell them to make a quick buck, without regard to
who it might hurt. Now we’re giving you a chance to clear the
air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. We know you did it. Now it’s your chance to get
the truth out in the open. Admit it – you bought that cocaine
with the intent to sell it.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t mine. It DETECTIVE: How can you sit there and lie to us when it’s clear
what you did? I know for a fact that a judge won’t look
favorably on you lying to us.
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SUSPECT: But it doesn’t belong to me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
Interrogation Transcript: False Evidence
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The drugs that the officer found.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you coming from tonight?
SUSPECT: I had just left work at Luigi’s.
DETECTIVE: Where is Luigi’s located?
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SUSPECT: Downtown on Broad Street. Right near the intersection
with Main.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And where were you driving?
SUSPECT: I was driving my coworker Jack to his place. He lives
over in the Westfield Apartment Complex.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Were you drinking tonight?
SUSPECT: No. We had just finished a shift.
DETECTIVE: And what time did you leave work?
SUSPECT: Um, I think it was around 11:30. 11:40 maybe.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what were you going to do at your
coworker’s home? Was there a party?
SUSPECT: No, I was just dropping him off. I was gonna go
straight home after.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Now tell me about what happened when Officer
Swanson pulled you over.
SUSPECT: I guess I didn’t stop all the way at a stop sign – I
don’t know, I thought I did. But I saw his lights so I pulled
over.
DETECTIVE: What time was this happening?
SUSPECT: It was just after we left work – maybe 11:45.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And then what happened?
SUSPECT: The officer asked to search my car, and I let him. I
didn’t think there was any reason not to. But then he found a
backpack in the back seat – Jack’s backpack – I had no idea what
was inside.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what did Officer Swanson find?
SUSPECT: He found a bag of drugs – coke I think. I swear I had
no idea it was there.
DETECTIVE: So he found cocaine inside the backpack that was
located in the back seat of your vehicle?
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SUSPECT: Yeah, but it wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Were you under the influence of cocaine or any other
illegal drug when you were pulled over?
SUSPECT: No, not at all. I swear – we had just come from work. I
don’t use drugs.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, not only did you have illegal
narcotics in your car – the car that you own and you were
driving – but you had a very large amount of the drug. It looks
like you had over 100 grams.
SUSPECT: I promise, I had no idea the coke was in there. It
wasn’t my backpack.
DETECTIVE: With a volume like that, we have reason to suspect
that you intended to sell the cocaine. That makes this a pretty
serious offense.
SUSPECT: What? No – no, I wasn’t. It wasn’t mine.
DETECTIVE: Alright, well we need to figure out what’s going on.
I want to give you a chance to tell me the truth.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: We found the drugs inside a vehicle that you own, and
that you were driving. There’s no ID in the backpack to suggest
that it belongs to anyone but you. We have every reason to
believe that the drugs belong to you. Now, it’s really important
that you tell us exactly what’s going on.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: I just need you to be straight with us. We have good
reason to believe you planned on selling the drugs. Our office
searched your car and found evidence of narcotics distribution.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know what we know. We know
exactly what’s going on. Not only did we find your drugs, but we
found baggies and a scale in the car too. These are clear signs
that you were running a business here - you were obviously
109

selling the coke, trying to make a few bucks. Now, I want to
give you a chance to come clean. Clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. We have the evidence. We know it’s yours, and
that you were selling. Now it’s your chance to get the truth in
the open; admit it – you bought that cocaine with the intent to
sell it.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t mine. It DETECTIVE: The physical evidence doesn’t lie. How can you just
sit there denying this?
SUSPECT: But it doesn’t belong to me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
CASE SUMMARY 3: Arson
Case Summary: Innocent
The following is a brief summary of the events of June 15, 2018, as you experienced them. For
the purposes of this study, you may consider this the “ground truth.” That is, the following
summary describes what actually occurred.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until one minute has elapsed.
In the March of 2018, you got a job as a line cook in a local restaurant in your hometown in
upstate New York. Although you enjoyed the work, you had a difficult manager who would
often pick on you and show favoritism to other employees. He always gave you the least
desirable shifts and would ridicule you in front of the other employees for preparing food slowly.
After three months of employment, your manager called you into his office and informed you
that you were being fired because of your bad attitude. You felt this was unfair and started
arguing with him. After a brief heated argument, you stormed out of his office.
A few weeks later on June 15, you were awakened in the middle of the night by a knock on the
door. Two police officers were waiting for you and informed you there had been a fire at the
110

restaurant where you had worked. Luckily, the fire was quickly contained by the fire department.
However, they suspect that the cause of the fire was arson. Your manager had informed the
police officers that you had reacted belligerently when you were fired, and therefore they had
reason to suspect that you were involved.
The officers arrested you on the charge of arson in the second degree and brought you to the
police station. One of the officers brought you into an interrogation room for questioning.
Because you did not commit the crime, you maintain your innocence throughout the
interrogation. An excerpt from the questioning session is on the next page.
Case Summary: Guilty
The following is a brief summary of the events of June 15, 2018, as you experienced them. For
the purposes of this study, you may consider this the “ground truth.” That is, the following
summary describes what actually occurred.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until one minute has elapsed.
In the March of 2018, you got a job as a line cook in a local restaurant in your hometown in
upstate New York. Although you enjoyed the work, you had a difficult manager who would
often pick on you and show favoritism to other employees. He always gave you the least
desirable shifts and would ridicule you in front of the other employees for preparing food slowly.
After three months of employment, your manager called you into his office and informed you
that you were being fired because of your bad attitude. You felt this was unfair and started
arguing with him. After a brief heated argument, you stormed out of his office.
A few weeks later, you decided you wanted to get even with your manager. On the evening of
June 15, you sneaked into the restaurant after closing. You piled some dirty dish towels on the
stove and turned the burners on to cause a fire. You then fled the scene before the fire spread.
You did not intend to hurt anyone, and you knew that the fire alarms would alert the fire
department before the building sustained major damage. You just wanted to cause enough
damage so that the restaurant was forced to close for a few weeks and that your manager was
fired for mismanagement.
In the middle of the night, you were awakened by a knock on the door. Two police officers were
waiting for you and informed you there had been a fire at the restaurant where you had worked.
Luckily, the fire was quickly contained by the fire department. However, they suspected that the
cause of the fire was arson. Your manager had informed the police officers that you had reacted
belligerently when you were fired, and therefore they had reason to suspect that you were
involved.
The officers arrested you on the charge of arson in the second degree and brought you to the
police station. One of the officers brought you into an interrogation room for questioning.
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Although you are guilty, you maintain your innocence throughout the interrogation. An excerpt
from the questioning session is on the next page.
Interrogation Transcript: Control
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fire at Luigi’s restaurant.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you at 11:00 PM?
SUSPECT: I was home, watching TV.
DETECTIVE: How long had you been at home?
SUSPECT: I got home from work around 5:30. I didn’t leave again,
I was home all night.
DETECTIVE: And was anyone there with you? Can anyone confirm
your location?
SUSPECT: No, I live alone. I was by myself.
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DETECTIVE: Okay. And what is your relationship with Luigi’s
restaurant?
SUSPECT: I used to work there. As a line cook.
DETECTIVE: And how long were you employed by the restaurant?
SUSPECT: I think about three months. I started back in March,
and then left last month.
DETECTIVE: Tell me why your employment was terminated.
SUSPECT: I was let go. The manager, Scott, accused me of having
a bad attitude.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And how did you react to being fired.
SUSPECT: I mean, I was pissed. I felt like he was treating me
unfairly. I worked really hard for him, and he was always
putting me down. I thought I deserved to keep my job. I was
upset.
DETECTIVE: Alright. So what did you do when he fired you?
SUSPECT: I told you, I got upset. I told Scott it was unfair of
him to fire me. We argued a little bit, but I could see that
there was no changing his mind. So I left the restaurant.
DETECTIVE: So you were resentful of Scott? Did you want to get
back at him?
SUSPECT: I mean, I was mad. He screwed me over. But it happened
weeks ago – I got over it.
DETECTIVE: You’re over it? It was only three weeks ago, and
Scott told us you were pretty upset.
SUSPECT: Yeah I was, but like I said, I got over it.
DETECTIVE: So you didn’t have any desire to hurt Scott in
retribution?
SUSPECT: No. No, not at all.
DETECTIVE: Alright, so why don’t you take me through your night
last night in more detail. Tell me exactly what you did.
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SUSPECT: Like I said, I got home from work around 5:30 –
DETECTIVE: And where are you working now?
SUSPECT: I got another job as a cook at a restaurant a couple
towns over. Sal’s Bistro.
DETECTIVE: Alright, continue.
SUSPECT: When I got home I heated up some leftover Chinese food
for dinner. Around 8:00, my mom called, and I talked to her for
a while. Then I put on a movie and just relaxed. That’s it.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, around 11:30 tonight the fire
department responded to a fire alarm at Luigi’s. It looks like
the fire was caused by flammable material being left on the
stove. We have reason to believe that the fire was set
intentionally – that it was arson. That’s where you come in. We
want to know if you know anything about this.
SUSPECT: I don’t know anything about it. I told you, I was home
all night. I wasn’t anywhere near Luigi’s.
DETECTIVE: What makes it worse is that there were people in the
building, in the adjacent store. They could have been hurt, or
worse. That makes this a second-degree arson. Now, would you be
surprised if I told you that we have reason to believe that you
were the individual who started the fire?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me.
DETECTIVE: We just want to understand how the fire started. I
want to give you a chance to tell me the truth.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: You were the last employee to be fired, and we have
reports of you acting belligerently when you were let go. We
have reason to believe that it was you who started the fire.
Now, it’s really important that you tell us exactly what
happened, as it happened.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: I need you to be completely honest with us. Now’s
your chance to tell us if you broke into Luigi’s tonight, and if
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you were the one who left towels on the stove. Now’s your chance
to tell us if you intentionally lit the restaurant on fire.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know what I need from you.
I’ve got to straighten out all the facts. I want to make sure
you’re being honest with us. We’re getting a lot of conflicting
information from you and Scott. I want to give you a chance to
tell your side of the story, to clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. You know, get the truth in the open, so we can
understand what’s really going on here. We believe that you may
have been the one who started the fire at Luigi’s.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t start the
fire.
DETECTIVE: We need more information from you. You know what
happened. Just be straight with me here.
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
Interrogation Transcript: Minimization
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
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SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fire at Luigi’s restaurant.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you at 11:00 PM?
SUSPECT: I was home, watching TV.
DETECTIVE: How long had you been at home?
SUSPECT: I got home from work around 5:30. I didn’t leave again,
I was home all night.
DETECTIVE: And was anyone there with you? Can anyone confirm
your location?
SUSPECT: No, I live alone. I was by myself.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what is your relationship with Luigi’s
restaurant?
SUSPECT: I used to work there. As a line cook.
DETECTIVE: And how long were you employed by the restaurant?
SUSPECT: I think about three months. I started back in March,
and then left last month.
DETECTIVE: Tell me why your employment was terminated.
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SUSPECT: I was let go. The manager, Scott, accused me of having
a bad attitude.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And how did you react to being fired.
SUSPECT: I mean, I was pissed. I felt like he was treating me
unfairly. I worked really hard for him, and he was always
putting me down. I thought I deserved to keep my job. I was
upset.
DETECTIVE: Alright. So what did you do when he fired you?
SUSPECT: I told you, I got upset. I told Scott it was unfair of
him to fire me. We argued a little bit, but I could see that
there was no changing his mind. So I left the restaurant.
DETECTIVE: So you were resentful of Scott? Did you want to get
back at him?
SUSPECT: I mean, I was mad. He screwed me over. But it happened
weeks ago – I got over it.
DETECTIVE: You’re over it? It was only three weeks ago, and
Scott told us you were pretty upset.
SUSPECT: Yeah I was, but like I said, I got over it.
DETECTIVE: So you didn’t have any desire to hurt Scott in
retribution?
SUSPECT: No. No, not at all.
DETECTIVE: Alright, so why don’t you take me through your night
last night in more detail. Tell me exactly what you did.
SUSPECT: Like I said, I got home from work around 5:30 –
DETECTIVE: And where are you working now?
SUSPECT: I got another job as a cook at a restaurant a couple
towns over. Sal’s Bistro.
DETECTIVE: Alright, continue.
SUSPECT: When I got home I heated up some leftover Chinese food
for dinner. Around 8:00, my mom called, and I talked to her for
a while. Then I put on a movie and just relaxed. That’s it.
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DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, around 11:30 tonight the fire
department responded to a fire alarm at Luigi’s. It looks like
the fire was caused by flammable material being left on the
stove. We have reason to believe that the fire was set
intentionally – that it was arson. That’s where you come in. We
want to know if you know anything about this.
SUSPECT: I don’t know anything about it. I told you, I was home
all night. I wasn’t anywhere near Luigi’s.
DETECTIVE: What makes it worse is that there were people in the
building, in the adjacent store. They could have been hurt, or
worse. That makes this a second-degree arson. Now, would you be
surprised if I told you that we have reason to believe that you
were the individual who started the fire?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me.
DETECTIVE: I just want to understand why this happened. I want
to give you a chance to tell me the truth. This is the way I see
it. This could have been way worse. You were upset, and you
weren’t thinking clearly. The fire could have been way worse –
it barely spread before the fire department responded. You could
have caused much more damage.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: I just mean I get how you feel. Scott clearly wasn’t
a saint. It sounds to me like he doesn’t deserve his job. He
should have been fired, not you. You were just acting
emotionally, not thinking clearly. You weren’t trying to do any
real damage, you just wanted to send a message.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: I don’t think you were trying to hurt anyone. You’re
not some crazed arsonist, not some psychopath. You were just
reacting to a bad situation – you handled it badly, but it could
have ended up worse, right?
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know where I stand. Like I
said, you weren’t out to hurt anyone, to kill anyone. You didn’t
know that there were people in the building at the time. You
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just wanted to cause a little trouble for Scott, right? I might
have even been tempted to do the same thing in your shoes. I
want to give you a chance to tell your side of the story, to
clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. You know, get the truth in the open, so we can
understand what really happened here. I want to know if I’m
right that you’re not the kind of person who would intentionally
put anyone in harm’s way. If you cooperate and come clean, maybe
we can help you out.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t start the
fire.
DETECTIVE: I’m on your side here. Just be straight with me. Tell
me the truth.
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t –
DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
Interrogation Transcript: Implicit Maximization
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
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SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fire at Luigi’s restaurant.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you at 11:00 PM?
SUSPECT: I was home, watching TV.
DETECTIVE: How long had you been at home?
SUSPECT: I got home from work around 5:30. I didn’t leave again,
I was home all night.
DETECTIVE: And was anyone there with you? Can anyone confirm
your location?
SUSPECT: No, I live alone. I was by myself.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what is your relationship with Luigi’s
restaurant?
SUSPECT: I used to work there. As a line cook.
DETECTIVE: And how long were you employed by the restaurant?
SUSPECT: I think about three months. I started back in March,
and then left last month.
DETECTIVE: Tell me why your employment was terminated.
SUSPECT: I was let go. The manager, Scott, accused me of having
a bad attitude.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And how did you react to being fired.
SUSPECT: I mean, I was pissed. I felt like he was treating me
unfairly. I worked really hard for him, and he was always
putting me down. I thought I deserved to keep my job. I was
upset.
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DETECTIVE: Alright. So what did you do when he fired you?
SUSPECT: I told you, I got upset. I told Scott it was unfair of
him to fire me. We argued a little bit, but I could see that
there was no changing his mind. So I left the restaurant.
DETECTIVE: So you were resentful of Scott? Did you want to get
back at him?
SUSPECT: I mean, I was mad. He screwed me over. But it happened
weeks ago – I got over it.
DETECTIVE: You’re over it? It was only three weeks ago, and
Scott told us you were pretty upset.
SUSPECT: Yeah I was, but like I said, I got over it.
DETECTIVE: So you didn’t have any desire to hurt Scott in
retribution?
SUSPECT: No. No, not at all.
DETECTIVE: Alright, so why don’t you take me through your night
last night in more detail. Tell me exactly what you did.
SUSPECT: Like I said, I got home from work around 5:30 –
DETECTIVE: And where are you working now?
SUSPECT: I got another job as a cook at a restaurant a couple
towns over. Sal’s Bistro.
DETECTIVE: Alright, continue.
SUSPECT: When I got home I heated up some leftover Chinese food
for dinner. Around 8:00, my mom called, and I talked to her for
a while. Then I put on a movie and just relaxed. That’s it.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, around 11:30 tonight the fire
department responded to a fire alarm at Luigi’s. It looks like
the fire was caused by flammable material being left on the
stove. We have reason to believe that the fire was set
intentionally – that it was arson. That’s where you come in. We
want to know if you know anything about this.
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SUSPECT: I don’t know anything about it. I told you, I was home
all night. I wasn’t anywhere near Luigi’s.
DETECTIVE: What makes it worse is that there were people in the
building, in the adjacent store. They could have been hurt, or
worse. That makes this a second-degree arson. Now, would you be
surprised if I told you that we have reason to believe that you
were the individual who started the fire?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me.
DETECTIVE: I just want to understand what happened. A fire was
started tonight. I want to give you a chance to tell me the
truth. We already know what happened. Now we just want to hear
it from you.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
DETECTIVE: We know you were the one who started the fire at
Luigi’s. It’s clear to us – you clearly had the motivation. I’ve
never seen such an open-and-closed case.
SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: This is not going to end well for you if you keep
denying it. Luigi’s is a popular restaurant here in town. And
I’ll tell you what – people are going to be upset. What you did
was inexcusable, and to make matters worse, now you’re lying to
us about it. A jury isn’t going to take this lightly.
SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: There’s no use denying it. We know you did it. We
have no doubt about this. You put the towels on the stove and
left the flame on. Now it’s time for you to tell us yourself.
We’re giving you a chance to clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. We know you did it. Now it’s your chance to get
the truth out in the open. Admit to what you did tonight. You
set fire to Luigi’s.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t start the
fire.
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DETECTIVE: How can you sit there and lie to us when it’s clear
what you did? I know for a fact that a judge won’t look
favorably on you lying to us.
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t –
DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
Interrogation Transcript: False Evidence
The following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interrogation. Please continue to imagine
that you are the suspect being questioned.
You can spend as much time as you need on this page, but you will not be able to advance to the
next page until two minutes have elapsed.
SPRINGFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT
TRANSCRIPT OF SUSPECT INTERROGATION
Saturday, July 16, 2018
Interrogation began at: 2:30 AM
DETECTIVE: Do you know why we brought you in tonight?
SUSPECT: You want to talk to me.
DETECTIVE: You know what we want to talk about?
SUSPECT: The fire at Luigi’s restaurant.
DETECTIVE: That’s right. I want to ask you some questions about
that.
SUSPECT: Okay.
DETECTIVE: Okay, so we want to figure out exactly what happened
tonight. Where were you at 11:00 PM?
SUSPECT: I was home, watching TV.
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DETECTIVE: How long had you been at home?
SUSPECT: I got home from work around 5:30. I didn’t leave again,
I was home all night.
DETECTIVE: And was anyone there with you? Can anyone confirm
your location?
SUSPECT: No, I live alone. I was by myself.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And what is your relationship with Luigi’s
restaurant?
SUSPECT: I used to work there. As a line cook.
DETECTIVE: And how long were you employed by the restaurant?
SUSPECT: I think about three months. I started back in March,
and then left last month.
DETECTIVE: Tell me why your employment was terminated.
SUSPECT: I was let go. The manager, Scott, accused me of having
a bad attitude.
DETECTIVE: Okay. And how did you react to being fired.
SUSPECT: I mean, I was pissed. I felt like he was treating me
unfairly. I worked really hard for him, and he was always
putting me down. I thought I deserved to keep my job. I was
upset.
DETECTIVE: Alright. So what did you do when he fired you?
SUSPECT: I told you, I got upset. I told Scott it was unfair of
him to fire me. We argued a little bit, but I could see that
there was no changing his mind. So I left the restaurant.
DETECTIVE: So you were resentful of Scott? Did you want to get
back at him?
SUSPECT: I mean, I was mad. He screwed me over. But it happened
weeks ago – I got over it.
DETECTIVE: You’re over it? It was only three weeks ago, and
Scott told us you were pretty upset.
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SUSPECT: Yeah I was, but like I said, I got over it.
DETECTIVE: So you didn’t have any desire to hurt Scott in
retribution?
SUSPECT: No. No, not at all.
DETECTIVE: Alright, so why don’t you take me through your night
last night in more detail. Tell me exactly what you did.
SUSPECT: Like I said, I got home from work around 5:30 –
DETECTIVE: And where are you working now?
SUSPECT: I got another job as a cook at a restaurant a couple
towns over. Sal’s Bistro.
DETECTIVE: Alright, continue.
SUSPECT: When I got home I heated up some leftover Chinese food
for dinner. Around 8:00, my mom called, and I talked to her for
a while. Then I put on a movie and just relaxed. That’s it.
DETECTIVE: Alright. Well, around 11:30 tonight the fire
department responded to a fire alarm at Luigi’s. It looks like
the fire was caused by flammable material being left on the
stove. We have reason to believe that the fire was set
intentionally – that it was arson. That’s where you come in. We
want to know if you know anything about this.
SUSPECT: I don’t know anything about it. I told you, I was home
all night. I wasn’t anywhere near Luigi’s.
DETECTIVE: What makes it worse is that there were people in the
building, in the adjacent store. They could have been hurt, or
worse. That makes this a second-degree arson. Now, would you be
surprised if I told you that we have reason to believe that you
were the individual who started the fire?
SUSPECT: What? No – no that’s not true. It wasn’t me.
DETECTIVE: I just want to understand why this happened. Someone
set fire to Luigi’s tonight. I want to give you a chance to tell
me the truth.
SUSPECT: What are you getting at?
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DETECTIVE: According to
motivation to burn down
believe that it was you
important that you tell
happened.

our investigation, you had the
the restaurant. We have reason to
who started the fire. Now, it’s really
us exactly what happened, as it

SUSPECT: But I didn’t –
DETECTIVE: I know that you were upset, but I need you to do your
best to tell us all the details, and to be completely honest
with us. We found your fingerprints SUSPECT: No –
DETECTIVE: Hang on, just let me finish. I want to hear your side
of the story, but I want to let you know what we know. We know
exactly what happened. Our forensic team dusted for prints, and
found prints that were an exact match to yours. They were on the
door to the kitchen, and all around the stove. Now, I want to
give you a chance to come clean. Clear the air.
SUSPECT: Clear the air?
DETECTIVE: Yeah. We have your prints. And they’re fresh too –
clearly left there last night. Now it’s your chance to get the
truth in the open; admit to what you did. You set fire to the
kitchen of Luigi’s.
SUSPECT: I swear it wasn’t me. I didn’t – I didn’t start the
fire.
DETECTIVE: Fingerprints don’t lie. How can you just sit there
denying this?
SUSPECT: But it wasn’t me. I didn’t - it wasn’t –
DETECTIVE: Look, I feel like we’re not getting anywhere here.
How about we take a little break, all right? I’m going to step
out for a few minutes and talk to my colleagues. You just sit
tight, all right?
SUSPECT: All right. Fine.
END OF TRANSCRIPT
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Appendix B
Study 1 Questionnaires
Plea Decision & Estimates of Trial Prospects
Despite your claims of innocence, a prosecutor decides to pursue criminal charges against you.
You must now choose between two options:
1. Go to trial: you can choose to go to trial for [charge], a Class B felony in New York State. At
trial, a jury will review the case evidence and decide if you are guilty of the crime based on the
strength of the evidence.
If the jury finds you guilty, you will be sentenced to between 5 and 25 years in prison. A judge
will determine the length of your prison sentence based on the specific details of your case and
the severity of the incident. If the jury finds you not guilty, you will receive no punishment. A
defense attorney informed you that approximately 90% of criminal defendants are found guilty
in jury trials.
2. Accept a plea deal: You can choose to plead guilty to a lesser charge of [charge], a Class C
felony in New York State. If you plead guilty, you will forgo a jury trial and you will receive a
definite sentence of 2 years in prison.
Keeping the details of the case and the interrogation in mind, please select a plea decision:
a. Accept the plea deal, admit guilt, and go to prison for 2 years.
b. Reject the peal deal in favor of a jury trial.
--page break-Imagine you chose to reject the plea and go to trial. Voluntary manslaughter is a Class B
felony subject to a sentence of between 5 and 25 years.
Keeping the details of the case and the interrogation in mind, please answer the following
questions:
On a scale of 0-100%, what is your probability of conviction at trial?
0% indicates that you are certain you will be found not guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and
100% indicates that you are certain you will be found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
______%
Imagine that the jury finds you guilty of voluntary manslaughter. What sentence would you
expect receive from the judge (in years in prison)?
_____ years
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Manipulation Check
Perceptions of Interrogation
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about the police
interrogation:
1. The interrogating police officer put pressure on me to confess to the crime.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

2. The interrogating police officer believed my statements during the interrogation.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

3. The interrogating police officer was certain I was guilty of the crime.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

4. The interrogating officer expressed understanding of my situation during the interrogation.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

5. If I confessed to the crime during the interrogation, I would receive a more lenient
punishment.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree
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Attention Check
1. What was the charge in the hypothetical crime scenario you read?
a) Criminal possession with the intent to distribute
b) Aggravated assault
c) Voluntary manslaughter
d) Arson
2. Which of the following sounds did you hear during the course of the study?
a) Instrumental music
d) A clock ticking
b) Static/white noise
e) Sirens
c) Traffic
f) I did not hear any sounds during the study
3. In the hypothetical scenario, were you guilty of the crime in question?
a) Yes
b) b) No
CASE SUMMARY 1: Voluntary manslaughter
4. In the interrogation transcript, which of the following did the police officer tell the you:
a) That the police obtained surveillance footage from outside the bar.
b) That the police believed that the victim was acting aggressively, and that you were acting
in self-defense.
c) That the case was open-and-closed, and the police had no doubt that you killed the
victim.
d) None of the above.
CASE SUMMARY 2: Possession with the intent to distribute
4. In the interrogation transcript, which of the following did the police officer tell the you:
a) That the police found evidence of cocaine distribution, such as small bags and a scale, in
your car.
b) That the situation could have been worse, and that you were young and just wanted to
have fun.
c) That the case was open-and-closed, and the police had no doubt that you were guilty of
possession with the intent to distribute.
d) None of the above.
CASE SUMMARY 3: Arson
4. In the interrogation transcript, which of the following did the police officer tell the you:
a) That the police found your fingerprints at the scene of the crime.
b) That your manager deserved to lose his job, and that you weren’t trying to hurt anyone.
c) That the case was open-and-closed, and the police had no doubt that you were guilty of
arson in the second degree.
d) None of the above.
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Appendix C
Study 2 Brainstorming Task
Instructions
On the following pages, you will be provided with several categories. Your task is to brainstorm
four items that fit into each category. Please see the example below.
Example: List the four busiest New York City subway stations
a) Times Square
b) 59th St – Columbus Circle
c) Grand Central
d) 34th St – Herald Square
We do not expect you to know the correct answers to every question. Rather we encourage
you to make your best guess for each question. Further, we ask that you fully complete each
question. You can list your answers in whatever order you like.
Questions 1-4 are labeled “collaborative problems” and you must complete these together as a
team. Discuss each question together and agree upon your answers before writing them down.
You both should record your agreed-upon answers on your respective worksheets.
Questions 5-8 are labeled “individual problems.” You must complete these by yourself. Do not
discuss your answers to these questions with your partner.
.
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Collaborative Questions: Discuss each of the following questions with your partner and record
your agreed-upon responses.
1. List the four highest paying occupations in the United States.
a)
b)
c)
d)

2. List the four most popular tourist attractions in New York City.
a)
b)
c)
d)

3. List the four least played college sports.
a)
b)
c)
d)

4. List the four most common crimes committed in Manhattan.
a)
b)
c)
d)
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Individual Questions: Complete each of the following questions by yourself.
5. List the four largest bodies of water in the world.
a)
b)
c)
d)

6. List the four undergraduate majors at John Jay with the fewest students enrolled.
a)
b)
c)
d)

7. List the four most popular girls’ names of 2000.
a)
b)
c)
d)

8. List the four U.S. states with the lowest average income.
a)
b)
c)
d)
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Appendix D
Study 2 Filler Task
Empathy Questionnaire
Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings and emotions of another person.
People who score high on empathy are usually better friends, romantic partners, parents, and
managers and tend to be more satisfied with their lives in general. Please indicate the extent to
which you agree with the following statements on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree).
Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neither
disagree
nor
agree

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I really enjoy caring for
other people.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. I often find it difficult to
judge if something is rude or
polite.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. I find it easy to put myself
in somebody else’s shoes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. I am good at predicting how
someone will feel.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. I tend to find social
situations confusing.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

1. I can easily tell if someone
else wants to enter a
conversation.
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Demographic Questionnaire
Please answer the following demographic questions:
1. With what gender do you identify?
a. Female
b. Male
c. Non-binary
d. Other: ________________

2. Age_________
3. What year are you in school?
a. Freshman
b. Sophomore
c. Junior
d. Senior
4. With which race or ethnicity do you most closely identify?
a. American Indian or Alaskan Native
b. Asian
c. Black or African American
d. Hispanic, Latino, or Latina
e. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
f. White or European American
g. Other: _____________________________
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Appendix E
Study 2 Plea Form

Academic Integrity Unit
Office of Academic Affairs
524 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019
REPORT OF ALLEGED AND/OR RESOLVED ACADEMIC INTEGRITY VIOLATION
This form must be completed by a faculty member in order to report any instance of suspected
academic dishonesty. This report should be signed by both the student and faculty member and
returned to the Academic Integrity Officer. Please keep copies of all documentation for your
files.
Faculty member name:

Dr. Margaret Kovera

Department:

Psychology

Student name:
Date of Incident:

[First and last name of participant]
[date]

Type of incident: ☐ Cheating ☐ Plagiarism ☐ Other

Description of incident:
Student cheating on a task during research study
Select one:
☐

The student accepts responsibility and agrees to the following sanctions:
10 hours community service

☐

The student challenges the claim that he/she committed an academic integrity violation.
The violation report will be sent to the John Jay Academic Integrity Committee for
review. The committee will determine if the student is guilty of the offense and decide on
the appropriate sanction.

Signatures:
Student:

Date:

Faculty member:

Date:
135

Appendix F
Plea Follow-up Form

Attention: John Jay Research Ethics Committee, Office of Human Subjects Protection
Subject: Report of adverse event during research study - Participant reaction
1. On a scale of 0-100%, what is the probability that the John Jay Academic Integrity Committee
would find you guilty of the incident in question? __________
2. If the John Jay Academic Integrity Committee were to find you guilty, what do you estimate
would be your punishment? _________ hours of community service.
3. Read each statement below and then circle the appropriate number that best indicates how you
feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers.
[Participants provided with the state measure of the STAI]
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Student Reactions to Adverse Event
Consider your interaction with the research assistant who administered the consent forms and
questionnaires during the study. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following
statements.
1. The research assistant put pressure on me to admit that I was responsible for the incident in
question.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

2. The research assistant believed my statements during the investigation.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

7
Strongly
agree

3. The research assistant was certain that I was guilty of the incident in question.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

4. The research assistant expressed understanding of my point of view during the investigation.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
disagree

Moderately
disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neither
agree nor
disagree

137

Slightly
agree

Moderately
agree

Strongly
agree

Appendix G
Interrogation Scripts
All Interrogation Conditions:
I was reviewing your answers, and I noticed that both you and (confederate’s name) put similar
answers for one of the individual problems. It is very unlikely that two participants provide the
same answer for this specific problem. Actually, there is less than a 5 percent chance that two
people would get such similar wrong answers.
Now, you don’t have to say anything right now about what happened. I actually recommend that
you don’t say anything to me at all, because this will all be included in the report I am required
to submit.
As I said at the beginning of the study, it was required that you work on these problems alone,
and therefore this is a problematic situation given that this is evidence that you and the other
student cheated by discussing your answers. We have never had this happen before, so I just
want to speak with you for a moment.
If you did cheat on this task, this is a violation of John Jay’s Academic Integrity Policy. The
university takes incidents of cheating very seriously, and therefore we are required to investigate
this incident fully and report our findings to the university’s Academic Integrity Board. If you
are found guilty of cheating, the board will decide on your punishment.
Control Only:
I am just required to inform you that we’re submitting this report to the university. Again, you
don’t have to admit anything to me right now, but is there anything you want to tell me or
anything you want to ask?

138

Minimization Only:
I understand that the questions can sometimes be difficult, and it might have been tempting to
work together. I’m sure you didn’t realize it was a big deal since this is just a research study. I
might even have done the same thing if I were in your shoes, and I’m sure you wouldn’t have
cheated if you knew it was this serious. Again, you don’t have to admit anything to me right
now, but is there anything you want to tell me or anything you want to ask?
Maximization Only:
It is very clear to us that some sort of cheating occurred here. The other student informed us that
you gave him/her an answer to one of the individual problems. Cheating is a very egregious
offense; the university takes these incidents very seriously and often hands down harsh
punishments to students who are found guilty of cheating. We have strong evidence that you
cheated and I’m sure you do not want this going on your permanent record and affecting your
future opportunities. Again, you don’t have to admit anything to me right now, but is there
anything you want to tell me or anything you want to ask?
All Interrogation Conditions:
As I said, we have never had this happen before and we are required to investigate the incident. I
did alert my supervisor and he/she would like to speak to you. Please wait here for a moment.

139

Appendix H
Plea Offer Script
Hi (participant’s name), my name is (name), I am a graduate student supervising this
study. My research assistant has informed me of the current situation. The professor in charge of
this study will not be happy to hear about this incident.
Given our suspicion of a violation of John Jay’s academic integrity policy, we are
required to submit a report to the school, and I am required to explain your options to you.
Your first option is to go in front of the university’s Academic Integrity Board. The board will
review the case facts and determine whether you are guilty of cheating. If they find you guilty,
they will determine an appropriate punishment. If they determine that you did not engage in
academic dishonesty, you will obviously not receive any punishment.
If the board does find you guilty of cheating, it is not the type of thing that would get you
expelled. If they find you guilty, they are required to assign a punishment of at least 40 hours of
community service, and they could assign up to 80 hours of community service. The exact
number of community service hours will be determined by the board based on the severity of the
offense. This community service will take place at John Jay and generally involves assisting the
university custodial staff or other similar tasks. Do you understand this option?
If you choose to take the case to the board, I will submit this report today and someone
will contact you within a week to set up your review date. You will be required to attend the
scheduled board review, at which point the board will review the evidence of academic
dishonesty and you will have the opportunity to argue your case in front of the board members.
Your other option is that you can file an official admission of guilt with me right now. This
means that you will forgo the review by the Academic Integrity board and will sign a statement
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right now admitting that you cheated on the task. If you choose this option, you will receive a set
punishment of only 10 hours of community service, compared to up to 80 hours that you could
potentially receive from the board.
Regardless of your decision, this incident will not go on your permanent record.
However, you will have a hold on your account until you complete your community service
hours. This means that you could have issues registering for classes or applying to graduate if
you don’t complete the hours in the time period agreed upon by you and the board. Once you
complete the hours, this hold will be removed. Do you understand this?
I can’t tell you what to do, but I do know that a lot of students that go in front of the
board for cheating are found guilty. I recommend that you consider your options carefully and
think realistically about how you would present your case to the board.
We need to file a report with your choice. Please read over this form (give form to
participant) and select whether you would like to accept responsibility for the incident right now
and commit to 10 hours of community service, or whether you would like to present your case to
the Academic Integrity Board and potentially receive up to 80 hours of community service.
Please also sign and date the form.
If students refuse to sign, tell them that failure to sign will result in automatic referral of their
case to the Academic Integrity Board. If they continue to refuse, ask them to verbally confirm
that they understand this.
We are also required to report any adverse events that occur during our study to the
research ethics committee that oversees all research studies that take place here at John Jay. Can
you please fill out this questionnaire about your perceptions of the event that just occurred? This
questionnaire is anonymous and will not be shared with the Academic Integrity Board.
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Give participant second questionnaire.
Thank you for your cooperation. Because you completed the study, we will still be
compensating you. Please wait for a moment, an RA will be in in a moment.
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